Valparaiso University

ValpoScholar
Law Faculty Publications

Law Faculty Presentations and Publications

2011

A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute
Robert Knowles
Valparaiso University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/law_fac_pubs
Part of the Courts Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons,
Jurisdiction Commons, and the Jurisprudence Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Knowles, A Realist Defense of the Alien Tort Statute, 88 Wash U. L. Rev. 1117 (2011).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Presentations and Publications at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff
member at scholar@valpo.edu.

A REALIST DEFENSE OF THE
ALIEN TORT STATUTE
ROBERT KNOWLES
ABSTRACT
This Article offers a new justification for modern litigation under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a provision from the 1789 Judiciary Act that
permits victims of human rights violations anywhere in the world to sue
tortfeasors in U.S. courts. The ATS, moribund for nearly 200 years, has
recently emerged as an important but controversial tool for the
enforcement of human rights norms. “Realist” critics contend that ATS
litigation exasperates U.S. allies and rivals, weakens efforts to combat
terrorism, and threatens U.S. sovereignty by importing into our
jurisprudence undemocratic international law norms. Defenders of the
statute, largely because they do not share the critics‟ realist assumptions
about international relations, have so far declined to engage with the
cost-benefit critique of ATS litigation and instead justify the ATS as a key
component in a global human rights regime.
This Article addresses the realists‟ critique on its own terms, offering
the first defense of ATS litigation that is itself rooted in realism—the view
that nations are unitary, rational actors pursuing their security in an
anarchic world and obeying international law only when it suits their
interests. In particular, this Article identifies three flaws in the current
realist ATS critique. First, critics rely on speculation about catastrophic
future costs without giving sufficient weight to the actual history of ATS
litigation and to the prudential and substantive limits courts have already
imposed on it. Second, critics‟ fears about the sovereignty costs that will
arise when federal courts incorporate international-law norms into
domestic law are overblown because U.S. law already reflects the limited
set of universal norms, such as torture and genocide, that are actionable
under the ATS. Finally, this realist critique fails to overcome the
incoherence created by contending that the exercise of jurisdiction by the
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courts may harm U.S. interests while also assuming that nations are
unitary, rational actors.
Moving beyond the current realist ATS critique, this Article offers a
new, positive realist argument for ATS litigation. This Article suggests
that, in practice, the U.S. government as a whole pursues its security and
economic interests in ATS litigation by signaling cooperativeness through
respect for human rights while also ensuring that the law is developed on
U.S. terms. This realist understanding, offered here for the first time, both
explains the persistence of ATS litigation and bridges the gap that has
frustrated efforts to weigh the ATS‟s true costs and benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has fascinated scholars since the Second
Circuit roused it from a 200-year-old slumber in 1980, holding that it
enabled Paraguayans to sue their own government officials in United
States courts for torture committed in Paraguay.1 This once-obscure
provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act—giving federal courts jurisdiction
over civil actions ―for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations‖—has become a unique vehicle for global human rights litigation.2
Modern ATS litigation has inspired a sharp debate, which continues to
rage about both its historical pedigree and the status of customary
international law (CIL) as federal common law.3 But doctrine and history
aside, the ATS‘s critics have also issued increasingly dire warnings about
its strategic costs for the United States. Critics contend that ATS litigation
irritates both allies and rivals, weakens efforts to combat terrorism, and
threatens U.S. sovereignty through the importation of undemocratic norms
developed by human rights groups, elite academics, and U.N. bureaucrats.4

1. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885, 887 (2d Cir. 1980). Although the acts alleged
were committed in Paraguay three years earlier, personal jurisdiction existed over the defendant, a
former police official, because he was living illegally in Brooklyn when the suit was filed. See id. at
878–79, 885. For a detailed discussion of Filartiga and a comprehensive history of ATS litigation, see
JEFFREY DAVIS, JUSTICE ACROSS BORDERS: THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN U.S. COURTS
(2008).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The current version reads in full: ―The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.‖ Id. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human
Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 457, 473 (2001) [hereinafter Bradley, Costs] (observing that
international human rights litigation is uniquely concentrated in U.S. courts because of the ATS). In
1993, Belgium enacted a statute providing universal jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide, but it was scaled back enormously a decade later. See Steven R. Ratner,
Belgium‟s War Crimes Statute: A Postmortem, 97 AM. J. INT‘L L. 888, 889–91 (2003).
3. CIL consists of norms that arise from state practices and a sense of obligation rather than
treaties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(2)
(1987). The doctrinal and historical debate over modern ATS litigation began when self-styled
―revisionists‖ launched a bracing critique of the ―modern position‖ that CIL is generally part of the
federal common law enforceable by U.S. courts through, among other mechanisms, the ATS. See, e.g.,
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816–17 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley &
Goldsmith, Modern Position]. In 2004, the Supreme Court permitted ATS litigation to continue, but
was vague enough so that both sides believed they had won. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S.
692, 712 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a jurisdictional statute that nonetheless makes actionable
violations of a limited set of CIL norms). For more on revisionism and the modern position, see infra
notes 60–78 and accompanying text. For a summary of the debate regarding the ATS‘s original
purpose and current status, see, for example, Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore,
Sosa, Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869
(2007).
4. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING MONSTER: THE
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In 2003, the ATS was likened to an ―awakening monster‖ threatening to
cause, among other things, a 10% drop in U.S. global trade.5
The ATS‘s defenders have disputed some of these arguments, but they
have engaged the cost-benefit critique only sporadically and
incompletely.6 They focus instead on the ATS‘s role in advancing a global
human rights regime.7 As a result, much of the cost-benefit critique has
gone unanswered. This Article is the first to articulate a rational-choice
defense of ATS litigation that fully addresses its strategic costs and
benefits for the United States.
Critics and defenders of ATS litigation start with radically different
assumptions about international relations (IR). The critique of ATS
litigation is, for the most part, grounded in realism—the influential view
that the global system is anarchic, populated solely by unitary

ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, at 14 (2003) (predicting that expanding ATS litigation against
corporations will cause severe disruption to the U.S. and global economies); Daniel Abebe, Not Just
Doctrine: The True Motivation for Federal Incorporation and International Human Rights Litigation,
29 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1 (2007) (using international relations realism to argue for greater judicial
deference to executive-branch views in ATS cases); Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 460–70
(discussing foreign policy and sovereignty costs for the U.S. and global community from ATS
litigation); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Approach to
the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 154–55 (2004) [hereinafter, Ku & Yoo, Beyond
Formalism] (concluding that a functional analysis of the ATS reveals that the costs of ATS litigation
in federal courts outweigh its benefits); John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, The Political Economy of
Customary International Law and the Alien Tort Claims Statute (April 29–30, 2010) [hereinafter
McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy] (transcript available at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
searlecenter/papers/McGinnis_ATS.pdf) (discussing sovereignty, foreign policy, and economic costs
for the United States from ATS litigation); Mark E. Rosen, The Alien Tort Statute: An Emerging
Threat to National Security (2003), http://www.nftc.org/default/usa%20engage/ATS%20-%20An%20
Emerging%20Threat%20to%20National%20Security.pdf (contending that ATS lawsuits against
private military contractors will interfere with the pursuit of U.S. national security policy).
5. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 26, 38 (predicting that billion-dollar awards in
ATS lawsuits will prompt massive disinvestment by U.S. multinational corporations from target
countries, causing at least a 10% drop in U.S. global trade).
6. See, e.g., HARRY AKOH, HOW A COUNTRY TREATS ITS CITIZENS NO LONGER EXCLUSIVE
DOMESTIC CONCERN: A HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE LITIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMITTED IN AFRICA 1980–2008, at 312 (2009) (concluding that
ATS litigation in Africa has had a positive effect on human rights in the target countries, advancing the
stated U.S. foreign policy of promoting human rights abroad); Sarah H. Cleveland, The Alien Tort
Statute, Civil Society, and Corporate Responsibility, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 971, 971 (2004) (arguing
that ATS litigation does not harm U.S. foreign relations, nor America‘s ―standing as an international
leader in the promotion and protection of human rights‖); Richard L. Herz, The Liberalizing Effects of
Tort: How Corporate Complicity Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute Advances Constructive
Engagement, 21 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 207, 209–10 (2008) (rejecting the U.S. government‘s argument
that ATS litigation harms efforts at democratic reform and thwarts the U.S. foreign policy goal of
respecting human rights). In addition, Sarah Cleveland focuses on human rights benefits and stresses
the courts‘ procedural and prudential mechanisms for limiting ATS litigation that might interfere with
the conduct of foreign relations. See Cleveland, supra, at 981–82.
7. See infra notes 114–26 and accompanying text.
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nation-states, and shaped by a small set of great powers balancing one
another.8 For the pure realist, the international system is a set of ―billiard
balls colliding.‖9 Realists argue that nations comply with international law
only when it serves their core interests of protecting their security and
sovereignty.10
Drawing on realism, critics conclude that ATS litigation is inefficient
and welfare-negative for the United States. For example, they argue that a
controversial ATS lawsuit against multinational corporations for aiding
and abetting apartheid-era abuses in South Africa punishes companies
with ties to the United States, leading to the loss of investment.11 Such
suits are said to provoke a backlash against the United States in affected
countries and antagonize its allies whose multinationals are being sued.12
Critics contend that U.S. courts, meanwhile, may use the ATS to import
into U.S. law ―raw‖ international law norms that have not been approved
by the democratic process through legislation or treaty making, weakening
U.S. sovereignty.13
In contrast, ATS defenders eschew IR realism and instead assume that
geopolitics can be influenced by international law independent of state
interests, that regime type matters, and that legal enforcement of human
rights norms can cause them to be internalized in nations.14 These

8. Robert O. Keohane, Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond, in
NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 158, 158 (Robert O. Keohane ed., 1986).
9. Daniel H. Nexon & Thomas Wright, What‟s at Stake in the American Empire Debate, 101
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 253, 256 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing realism in the
context of the American empire debate).
10. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 17–21; infra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of realism, see infra notes 99–114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of realism‘s
impact on U.S. foreign affairs law more generally, see Robert Knowles, American Hegemony and the
Foreign Affairs Constitution, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 87, 95–102 (2009).
11. See In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff‟d in part,
vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir.
2007), aff‟d without opinion sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008)
(affirming by default for lack of quorum). The Bush administration urged that the suits be dismissed,
citing, in part, these economic concerns. See infra notes 234–40 and accompanying text. A divided
panel of the Second Circuit recently held that the ATS does not provide jurisdiction for lawsuits
against corporations, stopping the South Africa litigation and perhaps signaling the future demise of all
ATS lawsuits against corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d
Cir. 2010).
12. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 32–35.
13. See id. at 14–15; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 464–69; John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin,
Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2007) (describing
international law not endorsed by the domestic political process as ―raw international law‖).
14. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 6, at 984–85; Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 199 (1996) [hereinafter Koh, Transnational Process]; Christiana
Ochoa, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of International Law: Identifying and Defining CIL Post Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 105, 108–09 (2005).
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assumptions partake of alternatives to realism in IR theory, including
liberalism and constructivism.15 For its defenders, ATS litigation
contributes to a global human rights regime that can substantially
influence nations‘ behaviors.16 The South African apartheid litigation, for
example, is said to demonstrate to the world that no one can escape justice
for human rights violations.17 ATS litigation is, for its defenders, one way
that international society can strengthen the rule of law and improve
governments‘ human rights practices.18
With critics and defenders largely talking past one another, it has
seemed that views of international relations dictate one‘s views of the
ATS. But this need not be true. Realist assumptions need not lead one to
reject ATS litigation. This Article separates assumptions from their
conventional conclusions and offers a defense of ATS litigation from a
realist perspective. In doing so, it supplies missing common ground for
further empirical studies about the costs and benefits of ATS litigation.
The project that this Article begins is especially important because
historical materials on the ATS are quite thin, and the relationship between
CIL and federal common law is especially murky.19 Because the debate
about doctrine and history remains stalemated, cost-benefit analysis takes
on greater significance.20
An evaluation of the realist, cost-benefit ATS critique on its own terms
reveals three major flaws. First, it is internally inconsistent. Realism holds
that nations are unitary, rational actors pursuing their interests.21 But
critics posit that U.S. courts‘ enforcement of the ATS harms U.S. interests.
In doing so, critics prematurely disregard the possibility that the U.S.
government as a whole acts rationally to pursue its interests through ATS

15. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 7. For a discussion of constructivism and liberalism, see infra
notes 122–27 and accompanying text.
16. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 985.
17. See, e.g., Jeremy Sarkin, Reparations for Past Wrongs: Using Domestic Courts Around the
World, Especially the United States, to Pursue African Human Rights Claims, 32 INT‘L J. LEGAL INFO.
426, 429–30 (2004) (concluding that the ―[t]he issue of compensation‖ for human rights abuses
through litigation ―has become so important‖ in part to ―deter future perpetrators from committing
similar violations in the future‖).
18. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 985.
19. See infra notes 41–78 and accompanying text.
20. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 94–111 (discussing the importance of cost-benefit analysis
for debates on the constitutional law of foreign affairs, given the relative paucity of textual and
historical evidence).
21. For a discussion of realism‘s similarities to, and differences from, other rational-choice
approaches to international relations, see Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and
Revisionism in International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1422–26 (2006). See also infra notes 99–
127 and accompanying text.
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litigation. Critics fail to consider the positive instrumental role that U.S.
courts can play in foreign policy, particularly when the United States is a
global provider of public goods seeking cooperation from other nations.22
Second, the ATS critique relies on speculation, not actual experience.
ATS litigation has resulted in just a handful of collectable judgments23 and
has not provoked an economic or diplomatic crisis for the United States.
So, the most trenchant criticism must be based on future, rather than past
or present, costs. Yet critics‘ sometimes-catastrophic predictions—
including a 2003 ―nightmare‖ scenario of a $26 billion class action by
100,000 Chinese plaintiffs within the decade—seem far from coming
true.24 Five ATS lawsuits against Chinese government officials, which are
a critical case study of ATS litigation‘s effects, have not caused any
visible rupture in the U.S.-China relationship.25 Moreover, in 2004‘s Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court, addressing the ATS for the first
time, limited actionable claims to certain core ―specific, universal, and
obligatory‖ human rights norms.26 These constraints, as well as various
jurisdictional and prudential tools available for courts to keep litigation in
check and the actual history of ATS litigation, all suggest that it is unlikely
to create the foreign policy problems its critics predict.27
Moreover, concerns about sovereignty costs are unfounded. Critics fail
to distinguish between the wholesale incorporation of customary
international law into U.S. domestic law and the very limited application
of a few universal, specific, and obligatory norms in Sosa-constrained
ATS litigation.28 Critics also confuse the doctrinal act of applying an
international law norm in ATS litigation with its actual effect on the body
of U.S. domestic law, which is negligible. Federal courts have not

22. See infra notes 305–17 and accompanying text.
23. AKOH, supra note 6, at 57 (noting that approximately $300 had been collected from one of
the African defendants); HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON, & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS (2007) (concluding that approximately $1.27
million has been collected from three defendants).
24. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 122.
25. See, e.g., Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1266 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (entering a default
declaratory judgment against the mayor of Beijing on claims by Falun Gong adherents for torture,
arbitrary detention, and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment following the 1999 crackdown). All
other lawsuits against Chinese officials were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds. See infra notes 214–
33 and accompanying text.
26. 542 U.S. 692, 749 (2004) (quoting Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (2003))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see infra notes 75–91 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part II.C.2.
28. See infra Part II.C.1.
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recognized ATS-actionable norms that do not already have counterparts in
U.S. law, and they are unlikely to do so.29
Finally, critics ignore the strategic benefits of ATS litigation, assuming
that its success should be measured solely by its ability to improve human
rights conditions worldwide and ―judicialize‖ international relations.30 By
describing its goals in these grand terms, ATS critics set it up for failure.
And while the advancement of human rights is a U.S. foreign policy
objective, realist critics can reasonably insist that it must yield to more
―fundamental‖ security and economic interests.31
ATS litigation may advance not just human rights, but U.S. security
and economic interests as well. By accounting for these effects, this
Article offers the first comprehensive explanation of the benefits of ATS
litigation.32 As the world‘s leading power, the United States provides a
number of global public goods—such as support for global trade and
security guarantees—from which it also benefits.33 It has the incentive to
signal cooperativeness so that it can provide those public goods more
easily, not because it is the most powerful state, but because it pays the
highest costs when it engages in self-restraint. In its present form, ATS
litigation represents a way for the United States to signal restraint more
cheaply than by simply complying with international human rights norms.
The United States signals cooperativeness in ATS litigation through
respect for human rights law while shaping that law in a way that suits its
interests and paying few, if any, sovereignty costs.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes both the doctrinal
and cost-benefit aspects of the debate about the ATS and the distinct,
underlying assumptions about international relations held by critics and
defenders. Part II responds to the functional critique of ATS litigation,
explaining why it is self-contradictory and why its claims about the
strategic effects of ATS litigation are unfounded. In Part III, I offer the

29. See infra notes 188–99 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part II.C.3.
31. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 33; infra notes 253–60 and accompanying text.
32. Former U.S. diplomats, in arguing for some exceptions to sovereign immunity under the
ATS, noted some of the strategic benefits of ATS litigation. See Brief for Former United States
Diplomats as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 16, Samantar v. Yousef, 130 S. Ct. 2278
(2010), available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/09-10/08-1555_Respondent
AmCu26FmrUSDiplomats.pdf (observing that human rights violations create economic and political
instability and that advancing human rights aids the U.S. in its battle for ―hearts and minds‖ around the
world).
33. See, e.g., MICHAEL MANDELBAUM, THE CASE FOR GOLIATH: HOW AMERICA ACTS AS THE
WORLD‘S GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 7–9, 31–139 (2005) (describing numerous
international public goods provided exclusively or primarily by the United States).
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first account of ATS litigation‘s strategic benefits from a realist
perspective. In doing so, it must be noted, I move slightly—but not too
far—away from realism. Although a pure realist rejects any purpose for
international law, if one leaves realist premises mostly intact but assumes
that states will sometimes comply with human rights law to signal
cooperativeness, a strategic purpose and benefit for the ATS emerges.34
Part IV weighs the costs and benefits of ATS litigation and concludes that
the benefits outweigh the costs. While the costs are often overstated, its
benefits for advancing both human rights and the strategic interests of the
United States justify and explain its continued existence.
I. THE ATS, REALISM, AND REVISIONISM
This section reviews the doctrinal and functional debate about ATS
litigation against the backdrop of the broader debate about the formal
status and purpose of international law. The critique of ATS litigation is
part of a broader ―revisionist‖ view that the incorporation of CIL into U.S.
law unwisely transfers power from the political branches and state
governments to international institutions and unelected federal judges.35
Although there are variations of revisionism and scholars who have carved
out middle paths between revisionism and what is known as the ―modern
position,‖36 I use the term revisionism here in a comprehensive sense:
revisionists view modern international human rights litigation in U.S.
federal courts—primarily through the ATS—as both pragmatically unwise
and unsupported in text, history, or doctrine.37
The revisionist view has both formal and functional aspects. Formalism
concerns the ways courts should be constrained by doctrine and the best

34. Even ATS critics seem to agree that realism, while the most useful perspective, does not
account for every interaction among nations. See infra notes 318–21 and accompanying text.
35. Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1406–07. Revisionism can also be seen as a branch
of the conservative critique of judicial ―activism,‖ although revisionism is not necessarily tied to
conservative politics. See G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 1089, 1180–82 (2005) (discussing the relationship between revisionism on the Supreme Court,
judicial restraint, and conservative politics).
36. The modern position generally refers to the view that CIL is, in some sense, part of U.S.
federal common law cognizable by federal courts. See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text.
37. It should be noted that some critics raise functional concerns about international human rights
litigation without expressing agreement with the formal—i.e., doctrinal, historical, and textual—
critique of ATS litigation. See, e.g., Abebe, supra note 4. Although I refer to all critics as
―revisionists,‖ and there is a connection between the formal and functional aspects of the critique, not
all critics are ―revisionists‖ in the way the term was originally used by Professors Bradley and
Goldsmith. See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text.
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interpretation of text, structure, and history.38 Functionalism, by contrast,
weighs the costs, benefits, and efficiency of laws or procedures.39 Until
now, the formalist side of the debate over ATS litigation has been much
more prominent, but this is changing. The post-9/11 transformation of
foreign affairs law has magnified the importance of functional arguments
for expanded executive power and limited judicial power.40 This trend
toward functionalism will likely exert more influence on the ATS debate
in the future.
A. The Alien Tort Statute
The long-obscure provision of the 1789 Judiciary Act now known as
the Alien Tort Statute—alternatively called the Alien Tort Claims Act41—
was famously described by Judge Henry Friendly as a ―legal Lohengrin‖
because ―no one seems to know whence it came.‖42 The lack of legislative

38. See Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636,
638 (1999) (―[F]ormalist strategies . . . entail three commitments: to promot[e] compliance with all
applicable legal formalities (whether . . . they make sense in the individual case), to ensur[e] rulebound law . . . and to constrain[] the discretion of judges . . . .‖). There is, of course, no consensus on
the precise boundaries between formalism and functionalism. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL‘Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (contrasting constitutional formalism with constitutional functionalism
and each theory‘s respective role in American legal history); Deborah N. Pearlstein, Form and
Function in the National Security Constitution, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1549, 1555–56 (2009) (observing
that the boundaries between functionalism and formalism are blurry).
39. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (describing
functionalism as an inquiry into whether ―a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful
in facilitating functions of government,‖ and concluding that ―[c]onvenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government‖); Pearlstein, supra note 38, at
1556–58.
40. In general, the post-9/11 literature on the foreign affairs constitution has been influenced by
the notion that terrorism and weapons of mass destruction are new threats that formalist
understandings of the Constitution are inadequate to address. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 97–99;
Pearlstein, supra note 38, at 1551–52.
41. 28 U.S.C. 1350 (2006). Those who interpret the provision as providing a cause of action
prefer the label ―Alien Tort Claims Act,‖ while those who contend it is merely jurisdictional prefer
―Alien Tort Statute.‖ Compare Beth Stephens, Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush
Administration‟s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004), with
Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT‘L L. 587 (2002). I use ―Alien
Tort Statute‖ here because that is the label given to it by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S.
428, 436 (1989).
42. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). The Lohengrin of German legend is
a knight who appears from nowhere to rescue a maiden, but disappears mysteriously when asked to
reveal his origins. See ROBERT JAFFRAY, THE TWO KNIGHTS OF THE SWAN: LOHENGRIN AND HELYAS
11 (1910). For a more detailed comparison of the ATS with Lohengrin, see Andrea Bianchi,
International Law and US Courts: The Myth of Lohengrin Revisited, 15 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 751, 754
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history has bedeviled interpreters for decades.43 In the first 200 years after
its enactment, the ATS was recognized only twice as a source of
jurisdiction.44
The Second Circuit launched the modern ATS litigation revolution in
1980 with Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.45 Two Paraguayan nationals, Dr. Joel
Filartiga and his daughter, filed suit in a U.S. district court in New York
against a Paraguayan police official, who was then living in New York, for
the torture and death of Filartiga‘s son in Paraguay.46 The Second Circuit
upheld the jurisdiction of the district court under the ATS, reasoning that
the Filartigas‘ claims arose under federal law because the ―constitutional
basis for the Alien Tort Statute is the law of nations, which has always
been part of the federal common law.‖47 The Second Circuit equated the
law of nations with contemporary CIL and examined several sources of
evidence—mainly, human rights treaties and U.N. declarations—in
reaching its conclusion that there ―exists an international consensus that
recognizes basic human rights and obligations owed by all governments to
their citizens,‖ including the prohibition on official torture.48 For the first
time, foreign nationals could sue one another in U.S. courts, even for CIL
violations occurring in their home countries.49
After Filartiga, many courts interpreted the ATS as providing a cause
of action for violations of CIL.50 Still, ATS litigation developed rather

(2004), and Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
830, 907 (2006).
43. For a recent attempt to unlock the original purpose of the ATS through examining the
historical materials and structure of the 1789 Judiciary Act, see, for example, Lee, supra note 42, at
906–07 (concluding that Congress intended the ATS to redress only violations of safe conduct, and
suggesting that this original purpose should be translated to limit contemporary application of the ATS
to violations with a sovereign U.S. nexus).
44. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 864–65 (D. Md. 1961) (holding that concealing the
foreign nationality of a child to bring her into the United States is a tort in violation of the law of
nations); Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810, 810–11 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607) (finding jurisdiction to
adjudicate the legality of the seizure of property of neutral aliens seized as prize cargo by a French
privateer under the ATS); cf. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13 (1975) (noting
that ATS jurisdiction ―may be available‖). Plaintiffs invoked the ATS in only about a dozen cases. See
Lee, supra note 42, at 832 & n.6 (listing cases).
45. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 877–78.
47. Id. at 878, 885.
48. Id. at 884 (quoting JOINT COMM., H.R. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS & S. COMM. ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 96TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1979, at 1 (Comm.
Print 1980)).
49. Id. at 878 (―[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nationality of the
parties. Thus, whenever an alleged torturer is found and served with process by an alien within our
borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction.‖).
50. Filtargia itself did not hold this, although it has been often interpreted as having done so.
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slowly. At first, plaintiffs targeted government officials or those acting
under color of state authority.51 Congress seemed to approve of
international human rights litigation by enacting the Torture Victims
Protection Act (TVPA) in 1992.52 The TVPA provides a federal cause of
action for damages against any ―individual who, under actual or apparent
authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual
to torture . . . or . . . extrajudicial killing.‖53 The TVPA has a narrower
scope than the ATS in several ways—it imposes a ten-year statute of
limitations, requires plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies, and provides
relief only for a narrow set of claims.54 But unlike the ATS, which is
limited to aliens, the TVPA permits U.S. citizens to obtain relief.55 Most
courts interpret the TVPA as serving to complement, rather than replace,
the ATS.56

See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We thus join the Second Circuit [in Filartiga] in concluding that the
[ATS] . . . creates a cause of action . . . .‖); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (―The ATCA provides a cause of action in tort for breaches
of international law.‖ (citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889)); see also Bradley, supra note 41, at 592 n.21.
51. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 1996) (affirming judgment
under the ATS against former Ethiopian official for torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading
treatment); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 244 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a Bosnian Serb leader‘s
alleged genocide, torture, and other atrocities were actionable under the ATS); Hilao, 25 F.3d at 1474–
75 (holding that the ATS not only provides federal courts with subject matter jurisdiction, but also
creates a cause of action for an alleged violation of the law of nations); Trajano v. Marcos (In re Estate
of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litig.), 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that alleged
torture by the Philippine President violated customary international law and gave rise to subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts under ATS); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 187–89 (D. Mass.
1995) (concluding that the Guatemalan military‘s tactics of torture, summary execution,
―disappearance,‖ and arbitrary detention were actionable under ATS).
52. Torture Victim Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). The TVPA implemented legislation for the Convention Against
Torture. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 65.
53. Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73.
54. See id. § 2(b) (establishing an exhaustion of remedies requirement); id. § 2(c) (establishing a
statute of limitations); id. § 3 (providing detailed definitions of torture and extrajudicial killing).
55. See Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, The Alien Tort Statute, and
Judicial Restraint, 25 B.U. INT‘L L.J. 1, 6–7 (2007).
56. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 153 (2d Cir. 2003) (recognizing that ―the
TVPA reaches conduct that may also be covered by the ATCA‖); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,
197 F.3d 161, 168–69 (5th Cir. 1999) (considering separately claims under the ATCA and TVPA that
are ―essentially predicated on the same claims of individual human rights abuses‖); Abebe-Jira, 72
F.3d at 848 (citing the TVPA as confirmation that the ATCA itself confers a private right of action);
Kadic, 70 F.3d at 241 (―The scope of the Alien Tort Act remains undiminished by enactment of the
Torture Victim Act.‖); Hilao, 103 F.3d at 778–79 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the TVPA codifies the
cause of action recognized to exist in the ATCA); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 96 CIV
8386, 2002 WL 319887, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (―[P]laintiffs‘ claims under ATCA are not
preempted by the TVPA. . . . [T]he TVPA simply provides an additional basis for assertion of claims
for torture and extrajudicial killing.‖); Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 993 F. Supp. 3, 7–9 (D.D.C.
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The ATS litigation against government officials was relatively
unsuccessful in obtaining collectable judgments, and it was often thwarted
by sovereign immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction.57 Plaintiffs began
to search elsewhere for sources of recovery. In 1996, Burmese citizens and
human rights groups sued the U.S. oil company Unocal in federal court in
California for alleged complicity in human rights violations by the
government of Myanmar (Burma) during the construction of an oil
pipeline.58 The Unocal case marked the beginning of the next wave of
ATS litigation aimed at holding multinational corporations (MNCs) liable
for aiding and abetting human rights violations.59
B. Revisionism
Meanwhile, revisionism was born. It began as a formalist, doctrinal
critique of conventional academic wisdom about the status of CIL as
federal common law. In 1997, Jack Goldsmith and Curtis Bradley ―shook
the international law academy‖ by criticizing what they termed ―the
modern position.‖60 Adopted by the Restatement and many scholars, the
modern position holds that CIL should be recognized by courts as federal
common law that preempts state law—even CIL that has not been
incorporated by the political branches through the constitutional
lawmaking process.61

1998) (recognizing simultaneous claims under the ATCA and the TVPA). But see Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 884–85 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiffs could not assert claims of
torture and extrajudicial killing as common law violations under the ATS generally and were instead
required to assert such claims under the TVPA, which has superseded the ATS with respect to these
specific claims).
57. Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 271, 276, 279 (2009).
58. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp 880, 883–84 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
59. See, e.g., Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 177 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that case
against Pfizer alleging nonconsensual medical experimentation on children in Nigeria could proceed
under the ATS); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2007), reh‟g granted en
banc, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007) (suit by residents of Bougainville Island, in Papua New Guinea, for
injuries relating to the mining activities of Rio Tinto, PLC, a British multinational corporation); Doe I
v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 393 F. Supp. 2d 20, 22–23 (D.D.C. 2005), appeal dismissed, 473 F.3d 345
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (suit by citizens of Indonesia against U.S. oil giant Exxon Mobil for complicity in
atrocities committed by the Indonesian government in the rebellious province of Aceh). However, a
divided panel of the Second Circuit has recently held that the ATS does not extend liability to
corporations. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010); see also infra note
249.
60. See William S. Dodge, Customary International Law and the Question of Legitimacy, 120
HARV. L. REV. F. 19, 19 (2007) (observing that Bradley and Goldsmith‘s original argument about the
status of CIL after Erie ―shook the international law academy‖). See generally Bradley & Goldsmith,
Modern Position, supra note 3.
61. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 819–20.
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This revisionist critique differs with the modern position on the proper
interpretation of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, which ended federal court
creation of general common law and held that state common law should be
applied ―[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
Acts of Congress.‖62 Customary international law—or ―the law of
nations,‖ as it was then known—was originally considered part of the
general common law, which both federal and state courts discerned.63 But
Erie transformed our understanding of the common law: judges no longer
discovered it, they made it. Declaring that ―there is no federal general
common law,‖ Erie effectively left general common lawmaking to state
courts and shrank federal courts‘ power.64 Because modern federal
common lawmaking must be authorized by legislation, revisionists
contend, there is no room for the independent judicial incorporation of
CIL.65
Focusing specifically on the ATS, revisionists argue that Erie‘s
repudiation of the general common law background against which the
ATS was enacted rendered it a dead letter. It is merely a jurisdictional
statute that provides no substantive causes of action.66 This interpretation
was adopted by conservative jurists—first by Judge Bork, and later by
three Supreme Court Justices in Sosa.67
Moreover, revisionists argue, CIL had evolved since 1789 in ways that
made it particularly unsuited for incorporation into federal common law.
Once devoted almost exclusively to nations‘ relations with one another,
CIL now also addresses the way nations treat their own citizens.68
Although the First U.S. Congress contemplated that some traditional CIL
claims would be heard by federal courts under the ATS, revisionists argue,
they would not have imagined that it would provide ―civil remedies in its
courts for human rights violations committed abroad by foreign

62. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
63. Ernest A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J.
INT‘L L. 365, 393 (2002).
64. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78; see Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 852–54.
65. Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 852–54.
66. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith III, The Current Illegitimacy of International
Human Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 358 (1999) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith,
Current Illegitimacy]; A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases, 20
YALE J. INT‘L L. 1 (1995).
67. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 739 (2004) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., and
the Chief Justice, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (―[I]t is essential that [the
allegedly violated law creates] an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be
allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal.‖).
68. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 66, at 327.

2011]

A REALIST DEFENSE

1131

government officials against aliens.‖69 In addition, modern CIL is
especially unsuitable for incorporation, revisionists contend, because many
modern CIL norms are embedded in human rights treaties and U.N.
resolutions that the United States has refused to ratify or has ratified only
with reservations.70 Incorporation of these norms through the ATS would
―permit[] federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what
the political branches have prohibited through the front door of treaties.‖71
In response, defenders of the modern position argue that the
revisionists read too much into Erie, which held only that federal courts
could not make a general common law of tort applicable in a state because
Congress lacked the power to legislate such rules and the courts would be
upsetting the federal-state allocation of authority in this area.72 Erie said
nothing about the quite distinct issue of CIL‘s status as federal common
law. Unlike the general common law, CIL norms can be incorporated by
Congress into U.S. law through its enumerated constitutional power to
define and punish offenses against the law of nations.73 This connection to
explicit federal lawmaking authority ties CIL to modern federal common
law, rather than the general common law. And because states have always
lacked authority over foreign affairs matters, when federal courts
recognize CIL norms, they do not infringe on areas of core state concern.74
As for the ATS, defenders observed that the Court had recognized,
from the founding era to the twentieth century, claims for violations of the
law of nations.75 In The Paquete Habana, the Court famously declared that
CIL ―is part of our law,‖ although its application by federal courts would
be subject to executive or congressional override.76 Defenders interpret the

69. Id. at 360.
70. See Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567,
567–68 (1997).
71. Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 66, at 330–31.
72. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga‟s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 468 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Is
International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1831 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, State
Law]; Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie,
66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393 (1997).
73. See Koh, State Law, supra note 72, at 1835. John Yoo and Julian Ku argue that state courts,
rather than federal courts, are best suited to exercise the authority to recognize customary international
law norms, subject to federal executive branch override. See Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra
note 4, at 215–16.
74. Koh, State Law, supra note 77, at 1831–32.
75. See id. at 1825.
76. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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Court‘s use of ―our law‖ to mean federal common law, while revisionists
interpret it to mean the general common law.77
With the notable exception of Judge Bork‘s Tel-Oren concurrence, the
courts generally adopted the modern position.78 ATS litigation continued
for fourteen years before the Supreme Court finally weighed in.
C. Sosa and Functional Approaches
As the debate between revisionists and defenders of the modern
position grew more heated in the late 1990s and early 2000s, many hoped
the Supreme Court would definitively resolve the question, but to no avail.
The Court waited until 2004 to interpret the ATS for the first time, in Sosa
v. Alvarez-Machain.79 In Sosa, the United States Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) had hired Mexican nationals to abduct the plaintiff,
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, from his home and bring him to the United
States for trial. Alvarez sued his captors under the ATS and the U.S.
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for arbitrary arrest
and detention.80 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected
Alvarez‘s claims, holding that his brief detention and transfer to the
custody of U.S. authorities did not violate a norm of international law ―so
well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy‖ under the
ATS.81
Justice Souter‘s majority opinion reflects an apparent decision by the
Court to keep ATS litigation alive but constrained. The Court gave both
revisionists and defenders something to cheer for, but in doing so left the
status of CIL in U.S. law unclear.82 The Court held that, although the ATS

77. See Bradley, Goldsmith, & Moore, supra note 3, at 883 (discussing the academic debate on
how to interpret Erie‘s effect on CIL). Compare Koh, State Law, supra note 72, at 1841, 1846
(arguing that CIL's status as federal law preempting state law has been established since ―the
beginning of the Republic‖ and reflects ―a long-accepted, traditional reading of the federal courts‘
function.‖), with Bradley & Goldsmith, Modern Position, supra note 3, at 822–26 (arguing that ―our
law‖ referred to the general common law).
78. See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.),
25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (―We thus join the Second Circuit [in Filartiga] in concluding that
the [ATS] creates a cause of action . . . .‖); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc.,
244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
79. 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
80. Id. at 697–98.
81. Id. at 738. Alvarez‘s FTCA claims were rejected on the ground that his abduction took place
outside the United States. See id. at 642.
82. Julian Ku, A No Decision Decision: Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Debate Over the
Domestic Status of Customary International Law, 101 AM. SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 267, 267 (2007)
(concluding that Sosa supports neither the revisionist nor modern position but is ―a pragmatic but
somewhat incoherent ratification of existing caselaw under the [ATS] based on no particular theory of
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is a jurisdictional statute that does not create a cause of action, the
common law gives rise to certain causes of action via the incorporation of
a ―modest number‖ of international legal norms with ―a potential for
personal liability.‖83 Sosa held that courts should recognize only CILbased claims resting on norms ―of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of
the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.‖84 The Court then cited,
approvingly, language from several post-Filartiga cases limiting ATS
liability to acts that violate ―specific, universal, and obligatory‖ norms.85
Furthermore, the Court indicated that it was aware of the impact ATS
litigation could have on U.S. interests abroad.86 In determining whether a
norm is sufficiently defined to support a private right of action, Sosa held
that courts must also consider ―risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences‖ from crafting ―remedies for the violation of new norms of
international law.‖87 The Court also observed that it would be appropriate
for federal courts to give ―case-specific deference to the political
branches‖ and require the ―exhaust[ion of] any remedies available in the
domestic legal system.‖88
The debate about history and doctrine, which Sosa failed to definitively
resolve, has reached a ―stalemate.‖89 In the meantime, functional
arguments about the costs and benefits of ATS litigation have been
engaged only sporadically.90 The revisionist critique always contained a
functionalist aspect: in the background was the concern that, because
federal courts are both politically unaccountable and incompetent in
incorporation‖). But see Bradley, Goldsmith & Moore, supra note 3 (arguing that Sosa supports the
revisionist position); Stephens, supra note 51 (arguing that Sosa endorsed the modern position); see
also Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: What Piracy Reveals About the
Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111 (2004) (concluding that, because
modern CIL human rights norms do not fit the criteria for universal jurisdiction in 1789, the set of
post-Sosa ATS-actionable norms is an empty one).
83. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
84. Id. at 725. The Court, here, refers to three specific offenses against the law of nations
addressed by the criminal law of England and mentioned by Blackstone in his commentaries: violation
of safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See id. at 715 (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)).
85. Id. at 732 (quoting Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human
Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
86. Id. at 727–28; see also Stephens, supra note 55, at 27 (observing that the Court addressed
critics‘ functional concerns).
87. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727–28.
88. Id. at 733 n.21.
89. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009).
90. See Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 459; Cleveland, supra note 6, at 986.
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foreign affairs matters, they should not be given the authority to import
external norms. After Sosa, Julian Ku and John Yoo observed that, in the
―sharp[]‖ and ―bitter‖ debate about whether the ATS creates a cause of
action, ―neither side has convinced the other‖ using formalist and
originalist methods.91 Professors Ku and Yoo took ―a different approach,‖
conducting a functionalist, ―comparative institutional analysis of the role
of the courts in foreign affairs.‖92 Their conclusion was that the costs of
ATS litigation outweighed its benefits because the courts were
incompetent to weigh the foreign policy implications of their judgments.93
Other critics have focused on the security, economic, and human rights
costs, making stark predictions that ATS litigation will run amuck.94 This
functional critique was shared, at least in part, by the Bush administration,
which, with the support of corporations fearful of lawsuits, reversed prior
executive branch policy and began to intervene in favor of defendants in
ATS cases.95
Defenders of the ATS have answered the functional critique by
emphasizing the value of ATS litigation for advancing human rights and
downplaying its foreign affairs side effects.96 They have argued that ATS
litigation enhances the legitimacy and authority of international law.97
Defenders have also noted the difficulty of demonstrating actionable
violations of CIL and the jurisdictional and prudential tools available to
courts for restricting ATS litigation.98 Finally, they have observed that the
protection of human rights is an official foreign policy goal of the United
States and that the promotion of human rights enhances America‘s
prestige.99 But defenders have not articulated a functional justification for
ATS litigation that accounts for U.S. security and economic interests.

91. Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 154.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 183.
94. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 56; Abebe, supra note 4, at 21; Bradley,
Costs, supra note 2, at 460; Rosen, supra note 4.
95. See Derek Baxter, Protecting the Power of the Judiciary: Why the Use of State Department
„Statements of Interest‟ in Alien Tort Statute Litigation Runs Afoul of Separation of Powers Concerns,
37 RUTGERS L.J. 807 (2006); Jide Nzelibe, Desperately Seeking Political Cover: The Partisan Logic of
Alien Tort Statute Litigation (April 29–30, 2010) [hereinafter Nzelibe, Partisan Logic] (transcript
available at www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/papers/Nzelibe_Alien_Tort_Statute.pdf).
96. See, e.g., Cleveland, supra note 6, at 976; Stephens, supra note 41, at 196–202.
97. See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 971.
98. See id. at 981; Stephens, supra note 41, at 196.
99. See AKOH, supra note 6, at 27.
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D. Revisionism and International Relations Theory
This debate about the purpose, scope, and proper operation of the ATS,
and the status of CIL as common law more generally, has evolved against
the backdrop of a broader discussion about the nature of international law.
Most revisionists reject the concept—long a staple of international law
scholarship—that international law exerts an independent ―compliance
pull‖ on states.100 Therefore, revisionists tend to agree that ―much of
customary international law is simply [a] coincidence of interest.‖101
Nations bow to international institutions of law, but should only do so
when it serves their interests.102
This skepticism about international law reflects the influence of
international relations realism.103 One of the most prominent IR
paradigms, realism, rests on three fundamental premises.104 First, it holds
that nation states—rather than individuals or institutions—are the basic
units of action in world affairs.105 The nation state is sovereign in that it
―decides for itself how it will cope with its internal and external
problems.‖106 Each nation is ―opaque‖: it has a unified relationship with
the rest of the world.107 Second, states are undifferentiated rational actors
driven by security interests, rather than regime type, norms, or
institutions.108 And finally, the international system is characterized by
anarchy because it lacks a central enforcement mechanism. Although there

100. See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2005);
Abebe, supra note 4, at 22.
101. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 225; see also Abebe, supra note 4, at 23.
102. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 234; Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations,
the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557 (2003); Julian G. Ku, The
Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 85
MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000).
103. HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE
271–72 (5th ed. 1973) (1948) (contending that ―considerations of power rather than law‖ determine
compliance with, and enforcement of, international law); Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at
1408.
104. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1980,
2000 (1993) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? (1992)); Keohane, supra note 8, at 158; Jeffrey W. Legro
& Andrew Moravcsik, Is Anybody Still a Realist?, 24 INT‘L SEC. 5, 5, 8 (1999) (discussing the
―degeneration‖ of realist theory after the end of the Cold War but observing that it ―remains the
primary or alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general theories of
world politics, particularly in security affairs‖).
105. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 113 (1979).
106. Id.
107. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT‘L L.
503, 507 (1995) [hereinafter Slaughter, International Law).
108. See id.
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are international laws and institutions, there is no world government with
the power to enforce laws.109 The United Nations and the World Bank
have no army or navy. Without such governing authority, nations can
never be sure if others will abide by agreements, and they have no means
of enforcing those agreements. They must engage in ―self-help.‖110 In this
anarchic environment, each state seeks to maximize its own economic and
military capacity relative to the others.111 This instability in the system,
realists contend, means that states have high discount rates. They seek
short-term gains rather than exercising self-restraint in favor of
longer-term gains.
For realists, efforts to construct a framework of binding international
legal norms are misguided and driven by naïve cosmopolitanism.112
Realists view CIL as largely reflecting the interests of the great powers
that dominate the international system.113 As a great power, the United
States can shape international law norms and depart from them when it
suits its purposes.114 Because it can ignore international law, the United
States suffers the greatest sovereignty costs from complying with
international law norms that do not coincide with its interests.115
A pure realist approach, then, has no use for international law because
it serves no purpose. The difficulty with this approach, however, is that it
fails to explain why nations expend vast resources on developing
international law, including complex treaty regimes with dispute
resolution mechanisms such as the WTO.116 And even the United States
feels the need to argue that it complies with customary international
human rights norms.117 Revisionists have acknowledged, therefore, that
realism does not completely describe the way that nations interact.118

109. See JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 30, 51 (2001).
110. Id. at 33; WALTZ, supra note 105, at 100.
111. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 109, at 33–34.
112. See, e.g., John R. Bolton, Is There Really “Law” in International Affairs?, 10 TRANSNAT‘L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 37 (2000); Stephen D. Krasner, Realist Views of International Law, 96 AM.
SOC‘Y INT‘L L. PROC. 265, 268 (2002) (―It is naive to expect that a stable international order can be
erected on normative principles embodied in international law.‖).
113. Abebe, supra note 4, at 21.
114. Id. at 25.
115. Id.
116. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV.
1823, 1837–38 (2002) [hereinafter Guzman, Compliance Theory].
117. See id.
118. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 41 n.150; Jack Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, The New
International Law Scholarship, 34 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 463, 468 (rejecting the view, attributed to
some ―realists,‖ that ―international law does nothing at all‖).
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In contrast, defenders of ATS litigation tend to be influenced by the
other, nonrealist end of the IR spectrum. They argue that ATS litigation
enhances ―the efforts of global civil society in developing the human
rights regime.‖119 Defenders place importance on the role played in ATS
litigation by subnational and transnational units, such as domestic
constituencies, NGOs, and international institutions.120 These units can act
as ―norm entrepreneurs‖ that develop human rights principles with the
power to influence cultures and governments, in part through litigation.121
These views of ATS litigation and international law reflect the
influence of liberalism and constructivism.122 In contrast to the realist
premise that states are undifferentiated opaque units, liberalism
emphasizes the ways that regime type, domestic interest groups, and
international institutions affect state interactions. Liberal, democratic
states tend to have less conflict with one another and enter into and
comply with legal agreements more often.123 Governments comply with
international law in part because domestic interest groups exert
pressure.124 ATS litigation succeeds because domestic constituencies
shape nations‘ preferences for human rights. Constructivism emphasizes
the role of perceptions and beliefs in shaping state behavior.125 For
constructivists, similarly situated states may act differently because they
have divergent understandings of the strategic environment and other
states‘ intentions.126 These perceptions and beliefs can be shaped by
exogenous forces, such as ATS litigation, that encourage states to
internalize human rights norms.127

119. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 975–76.
120. See Cheryl Holzmeyer, Human Rights in an Era of Neoliberal Globalization: The Alien Tort
Claims Act and Grassroots Mobilization in Doe v. Unocal, 43 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 271, 272
(describing how human rights activists in the United States and Burma mobilized in support of the
ATS claims against Unocal and emphasizing the impact of ―a transnationally attuned legal
mobilization framework‖).
121. See Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35
HOUS. L. REV. 623, 647 (1998) [hereinafter Koh, International Law].
122. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 11–12.
123. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1432–33; Andrew Moravcsik, Taking
Preference Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT‘L ORG. 513, 513 (1997);
Slaughter, International Law, supra note 107.
124. See Moravcsik, supra note 123, at 513.
125. See Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1435–36. See generally ALEXANDER WENDT,
SOCIAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1999).
126. Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation, 40 WORLD POL. 317, 337 (1988).
127. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 976–79; Ochoa, supra note 14, at 108–09. Peter Spiro has
recently used liberalist and constructivist approaches to predict that subnational institutions, including
―disaggregated governmental components beyond the traditional foreign policy apparatus,‖ may be
developing an institutional interest in the incorporation of international law into domestic law. Peter S.
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Institutionalism is another major paradigm of international relations
theory that shares many assumptions with realism. It also holds that states
are unitary, rational agents pursuing their interests in an anarchic world.128
However, institutionalists conclude that nations cooperate to maximize
absolute gains and that international institutions—including international
law—can facilitate cooperation.129 It is important to note that an
institutionalist need not ascribe to the view that states have an innate
interest in complying with international law or sense of obligation to do
so.130 And institutionalist views can lead one to conclude that ATS
litigation is either wise or unwise, depending on its potential for
maximizing payoffs.
With revisionists influenced by realism and defenders influenced by its
alternatives, little common ground currently exists from which to evaluate
the costs and benefits of ATS litigation. Neither side has effectively
engaged with the other. Yet one‘s theoretical approach to international
relations need not dictate a particular view of ATS litigation. Realism may
be entirely consistent with the conclusion that ATS litigation is
strategically beneficial for the United States.131
II. THE REALIST CRITIQUE OF ATS LITIGATION
This Section describes the realist, functional ATS critique and explains
why it is problematic. The revisionists argue that the domestic
incorporation of CIL should only be effectuated through the political
branches in the form of legislation, executive-branch action, or, if the
courts are to be involved at all, very strong deference to executive-branch
interpretation.132 The revisionist critique consists of three primary
arguments. First, revisionists contend that ATS litigation imposes
significant sovereignty costs on the United States by importing exogenous
legal norms that lack democratic pedigree. In an anarchic world with
shifting power balances, it is unwise for the United States to commit itself

Spiro, Disaggregating U.S. Interests in International Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 196
(2004).
128. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 17–21 (2008).
129. See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD
POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984); Hathaway & Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1430.
130. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1950–51 (2002).
131. See infra Part IV.
132. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 19.
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to particular international law norms.133 Second, revisionists argue that
ATS litigation harms U.S. security and economic interests by causing
friction with allies and potential rivals. Finally, revisionists contend that,
to the extent the United States has a national interest in improving human
rights worldwide, ATS litigation fails to further this interest and in fact
may thwart it.
Below, I begin with general difficulties that the revisionist approach
fails to overcome: it relies on institutional competence arguments that are
questionable, and it draws on insights from realism without fully accepting
the implications of applying realism to evaluate the role of courts in
foreign affairs. I then explain why the specific functional arguments
against ATS litigation lack support and do not properly weigh
countervailing evidence.
A. Courts‟ Competence in Foreign Affairs
The arguments advanced by the ATS‘s critics are often intertwined
with a set of assumptions about the comparative institutional competence
of courts and the executive branch in foreign affairs. Many, but not all,
revisionists rely on these assumptions to argue for strong deference by the
courts to the executive branch in other contexts.134
These institutional competence claims are rooted in an outdated version
of IR realism.135 The realist justification for executive hypercompetence
and judicial incompetence in foreign affairs proceeds along the following
lines: due to the anarchic and fluid nature of the international realm,
executive primacy is justified by the executive‘s superior expertise,
information gathering, and political savvy in foreign affairs. Foreign
affairs matters are particularly complicated, and the meaning of
international law changes with geopolitical shifts; courts are ill suited to
address foreign affairs because they lack special expertise, are relatively
inflexible, and hear only the issues selected by litigants.136 Because nations
are unitary actors on the world stage, the United States must ―speak with

133. Abebe, supra note 4, at 8–9; McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1.
134. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 200–01 (2006) [hereinafter Ku
& Yoo, Hamdan]; Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116
YALE L.J. 1170, 1202 (2007); John C. Yoo, Treaty Interpretation and the False Sirens of Delegation,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1305, 1305 (2002) (arguing for total deference to executive interpretations of
treaties, based in part on the anarchic nature of the international realm).
135. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 127–38.
136. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134, at 200–01; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 134, at
1204–05.
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one voice‖ in foreign relations through the executive branch, without the
courts second guessing its decisions, or risk creating confusion and
suffering embarrassment and weakness.137 The executive branch can better
respond to changes in an unstable world because it can move with unity
and speed, while federal courts are decentralized, rarely able to make
uniform or quick decisions, and change course very slowly.138 Finally, as
the least politically accountable branch, the judicial system least reflects
the national interest and is least likely to be responsive to national security
needs.139
These realism-based institutional competence assumptions are
intuitively very persuasive. That is why they are often simply stated as
―traditional . . . understandings‖ and persist in court decisions.140 But they
are surprisingly brittle. This classic realist model of institutional
competence proves unhelpful for three reasons. First, as a descriptive
matter, it does not accurately depict the actual functioning of the branches
in foreign affairs. The executive does not in fact always dominate. For
example, although foreign relations is said to require that the United States
―speak with one voice,‖ Congress and the President often conflict on
foreign policy.141 Second, maintaining a distinct model of foreign affairs
institutional competence becomes increasingly problematic as
globalization continues to blur the distinction between domestic and
foreign affairs issues.142 Federal courts are increasingly required to handle
cases involving foreign parties and foreign activities. And finally, the
realist model proves too much because, if actually adopted, it would
137. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 702 (2008) (―The Judiciary is not suited to second-guess . . .
determinations that would require federal courts to . . . undermine the Government‘s ability to speak
with one voice in this area.‖); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)
(―[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.‖).
138. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134, at 200 (arguing that the institutional structure
of the federal judiciary—ninety-four district courts and thirteen appellate courts—inherently makes the
judicial process slow); Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 980
(2004) (―In the context of foreign affairs . . . an authoritative settlement of the law across time and
institutions . . . . potentially results in the creation of a constitutional straight-jacket binding the
decision-making freedom of the political branches in the international arena.‖).
139. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 1213.
140. See, e.g., id. at 1202 (describing the justifications for special deference in foreign relations as
―often less textual than functional, based on traditional practices and understandings‖). For a fuller
discussion of realism‘s influence on the development of foreign affairs law, see Knowles, supra note
10, at 111–26.
141. See Nzelibe, supra note 138, at 965–66 (discussing examples); Martin H. Redish, Judicial
Review and the „Political Question,‟ 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1031, 1052 (1985) (observing that the nation
has survived despite interbranch disagreement in foreign affairs).
142. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J.
1230, 1231–35 (2007).
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require total deference by the courts to the executive, and it tells us very
little about how best to balance foreign policy effectiveness against other
constitutional values.143
In the end, the traditional competency-based arguments against courts‘
involvement in foreign affairs paint with too broad a brush. They offer
little utility for determining whether ATS litigation harms or benefits the
United States. These arguments do not take account of the possibility that
the courts and the executive branch can work in complementary fashion in
foreign affairs, just as they do in domestic affairs.144 As foreign policy
instruments, courts may be useful in some respects and less so in others.
B. Contradictions in the Realist Critique
While the classic realist competence model proves problematic for
evaluating the role of courts in foreign affairs generally, the use of realism
also poses unique problems for the critics of ATS litigation. Realism‘s
great strength is in its parsimony.145 It treats nations as single units with
one overriding interest: their security.146 But this parsimony creates
problems for the critique of ATS litigation. The ATS critique treats other
nations as single units, but does not treat the United States as a unitary
actor because it makes claims about the comparative effectiveness of U.S.
institutions.147 Drawing on the anarchic nature of world politics to critique
the role of the courts in domestic governance, the ATS critique pierces the
veil of the unitary state. Under Sosa, the ATS embodies Congress‘s
instruction that courts entertain suits alleging a limited set of CIL
claims.148 Yet the core of the revisionist critique is that this instruction is
not rational because it is welfare-negative for the United States.
Revisionists must somewhat dissociate the courts from the pursuit of the
national interest.

143. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 130–34.
144. See id.
145. See FAREED ZAKARIA, FROM WEALTH TO POWER: THE UNUSUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICA‘S
WORLD ROLE 35 (1998) [hereinafter ZAKARIA, WEALTH]. Zakaria observes that classical realism‘s
―extreme parsimony‖ is its ―great strength‖ because this can be a basis for elegant, easily falsifiable
propositions that enable it to be ―powerfully predictive.‖ Id.
146. WALTZ, supra note 105, at 79–98. Waltz and other realists acknowledge that the actual
interactions of nations will often depart significantly from these assumptions, but observe that the
value of descriptive accuracy must be weighed against the greater predictive power of a parsimonious
theory. Kenneth N. Waltz, Laws and Theories, in NEOREALISM AND ITS CRITICS 27, 34 (Robert O.
Keohane ed., 1986).
147. See, e.g., Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 189.
148. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a jurisdictional
statute that nonetheless makes actionable violations of a limited set of CIL norms).
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To some degree, this reflects a problem with realism itself. The
classical version did not merely predict, but purported to advise the
statesman on how best to manage foreign policy and international affairs
in an unstable world. A rough-and-ready version of classical realism is the
unacknowledged foundation for much of courts‘ and scholars‘
justifications for executive primacy in foreign affairs.149 The revisionist
critique is very much in this tradition. By contrast, however, the more
contemporary incarnation of IR realism, called neorealism, has been
devoted, with some exceptions, to analyzing and predicting states‘
behavior as dictated by the structure of the international system.150 There
is far less room for normative arguments about statecraft. In this way, the
revisionist critique sits quite uneasily with neorealism.
Revisionists must reach beyond realism because it does not provide
much space for criticizing international human rights litigation in U.S.
courts. Assuming first, as the pure realist must, that the United States is, as
a whole, a rational actor, how can we descriptively account for the
persistence of welfare-negative ATS litigation?151 Congress has not
reigned in the ATS since Filartiga, and in fact has expanded the federal
courts‘ role in international human rights litigation through the ATS‘s
sibling, the TVPA.152 Does the proliferation of ATS litigation then call
into question the predictive accuracy of the realist insights animating the
revisionist critique?
This difficulty is not insurmountable for the ATS critic drawing on
realism. ATS litigation may persist as a strategic mistake that must be
corrected.153 Yet it is significant that the revisionist critique proceeds from
a worldview that imagines other nations as acting strategically in response
to ATS litigation without considering that ATS litigation itself may have
strategic value for the United States. Instead, critics have reasoned that
ATS litigation must be driven by nonrealist paradigms of international
relations. A more holistic realist approach to the ATS‘s costs and benefits

149. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 111–16.
150. See Keohane, supra note 8, at 25–27.
151. Cf. Hathaway and Lavinbuk, supra note 21, at 1434 (critiquing Goldsmith & Posner‘s use of
state‘s internal political economies as determining state preferences on the ground that it creates
ambiguity about state‘s interests, and observing that ―the possibility that the desires of powerful
substate actors may be welfare-negative for the states as whole units‖ is ―decidedly inconsistent with
[the] general assumption that states can be treated as rational unitary actors‖).
152. See supra notes 47–52 and accompanying text.
153. See John J. Mearsheimer, Structural Realism, in INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORIES:
DISCIPLINE AND DIVERSITY 71, 74 (Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki & Steve Smith eds., 2006) (observing
that, although states are rational actors, they ―operate with imperfect information in a complicated
world‖ and ―sometimes make serious mistakes.‖).
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considers the ways in which the branches provide diverse means of
achieving foreign policy goals. In Part III, I offer such an approach.
C. The Problematic Functional Arguments Against ATS Litigation
Below, I explain why each aspect of the revisionist critique is
problematic. In general, the critique overvalues the security and economic
costs of ATS litigation and undervalues the human rights benefits. But
more importantly, the revisionist critique relies largely on speculation
about future harms from ATS litigation that are very unlikely to occur.
Revisionists also ascribe ambitious objectives to ATS litigation that it
cannot possibly meet, making it easier to portray ATS litigation as
ineffectual. These errors lead to a skewed assessment of costs and benefits.
1. Sovereignty Costs
A pillar of the realist ATS critique involves the sovereignty costs from
the importation of international human rights norms into the U.S. legal
system.154 Under a realist paradigm of international relations, state
sovereignty is the core building block of the global system.155 Because the
United States has ratified so few treaties governing human rights, CIL is
the basis for most claims under the ATS.156 Revisionists argue that CIL, in
its current form, is so likely to be different from U.S. law that its use by
U.S. courts imposes serious sovereignty costs.157 There are two major
problems with this argument. First, revisionists tend to lump together ATS
litigation, which involves only a modest set of core CIL claims, with the
wholesale incorporation of CIL into domestic law.158 Second, the
revisionist argument confuses the doctrinal act of applying a CIL norm in
ATS litigation with its actual effect on the body of U.S. domestic law.159
The revisionists‘ sovereignty concern stems from both the substance of
international human rights law and the processes of its development. With
some limited exceptions, CIL traditionally governed relationships among
states and could be determined by examining state behavior and opinio
juris, the belief on the part of states that they have a legal obligation to

154. See, e.g., Abebe, supra note 4, at 3–5; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 465–66.
155. See WALTZ, supra note 105, at 47.
156. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
157. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 22–23.
158. See, e.g., Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 464 (describing costs to U.S. democracy from
international human rights litigation because of ―the type of law typically applied in these cases‖).
159. See infra notes 184–90 and accompanying text.
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obey norms established by state behavior.160 Of course, defining ―state
behavior‖ has always been a serious challenge. What sources should be
consulted? Most states do not declare their own practices, and there is no
consensus about the appropriate interpretive method to determine whether
practices are widespread or consistent. And how does one discern what
states actually believe about their own obligations?161
Much of recent human rights law adds an additional layer of difficulty
because it develops quickly from diffuse sources and purports to regulate
the relationship between states and their own citizens.162 International
human rights norms increasingly derive, not from state practice, but from
an ever-proliferating constellation of nonratified multilateral treaties, as
well as from national constitutions, unanimous and near-unanimous
declarations of the U.N. General Assembly, and other international fora
such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ).163 These agreements cover
an increasingly broad array of issues traditionally thought to be of purely
domestic concern, in areas such as labor, family, and environmental law.
The development of these human rights norms is shaped by academics—
―the professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of
articles in leading international law journals‖—as well as
transgovernmental human rights advocacy organizations.164
According to the revisionists, incorporation of the ―new‖ CIL into U.S.
domestic law imposes sovereignty costs on the United States.165 Under a
realist view of international law, the ―traditional‖ CIL merely reflects the
interests of the great powers. As the sole superpower or hegemon, the
United States is in a favorable position to dictate the framework of
traditional CIL.166 But the United States has less ability to influence a
rapidly developing body of indeterminate law shaped by international
elites. This is evidenced by the fact that the United States often fails to
ratify, or attaches reservations or modifications to, the international
conventions and treaties supporting many new CIL norms. Moreover, the
United States and Europe have diverged in their understandings of
important CIL norms, including those that govern the use of the death
penalty and preventive war.167 Because the new human rights CIL norms

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Abebe, supra note 4, at 22–23.
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1207–08.
Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 462.
See id.
Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 GA. J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 399, 399 (1996).
See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1177–78.
Abebe, supra note 4, at 25.
See Warren Allmand et al., Human Rights and Human Wrongs: Is the United States Death
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do not reflect the outcome of the democratic process in the United States
(unless they have been duly ratified by domestic political decision
making), they are less likely to reflect U.S. interests.168
Sovereignty is the ability of a state to exclude ―external actors from
domestic authority structures.‖169 Because the United States dominates
international politics, it can afford to ignore international law harmful to
its interests. Therefore, the revisionist argument goes, the United States
suffers the largest sovereignty costs of any nation from incorporating CIL
norms into its domestic legal framework.170
However, it is not at all apparent that ATS litigation constrained by
Sosa‘s limitations actually imposes significant sovereignty costs. U.S.
courts are not ―outside actors,‖ but internal actors. Again, in order to
accept the revisionist argument, one must first assume that the federal
courts—as institutions of the U.S. government—are capable of acting in a
manner antithetical to U.S. interests. This contradicts the realist
descriptive insight—relied on by revisionists—that a state complies with
international law only when it is in its interest.171 Under a pure realist
approach assuming a unitary United States government, if a court applies a
CIL norm, it must be doing so to further U.S. interests. The sovereignty
cost would then be zero because the U.S. has not ceded any power to
external actors merely by using international law as the rationale for doing
what it sought to do anyway.172 To posit sovereignty costs from ATS
litigation, revisionists must depart from realism by disaggregating the
unitary state and associating state interests with the policies of one or both
of the political branches rather than the less-accountable courts. When the
courts apply a CIL norm over the objection of the political branches, they
allegedly cause an inefficient result.
But even identifying state interests with the political branches does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that ATS litigation imposes sovereignty
costs. ATS litigation does not result from a clash between the political
branches and the courts. Congress enacted the ATS, and the President

Penalty System Inconsistent with International Human Rights Law?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2793
(1999); McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1179.
168. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1178–79.
169. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 20 (1999).
170. Abebe, supra note 4, at 26.
171. See supra notes 112–18 and accompanying text.
172. Barry Friedman has recently offered an account of Supreme Court history, concluding that it
never strays very far from popular opinion. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE (2009).
To the extent this account is accurate, it casts doubt on the usefulness of associating state interests
merely with the current position of the executive branch.
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signed it into law. Some administrations have been more supportive of
ATS litigation than others.173 Assuming that the Sosa interpretation is
correct, Congress and the President empowered the courts to hear certain
CIL-based claims, contemplating that CIL norms could be ―locked in‖
absent a legislative override.174 Think of the executive branch as divisible
into ―time zero‖ (executive policy at the time of enactment) and ―time
one‖ (executive policy in the present). If the ―time one‖ executive branch
objects to the incorporation of CIL norms, but Congress does not object,
Congress and the ―time zero‖ executive disagree with the ―time one‖
executive. The revisionist critique, therefore, must ultimately rest on one
of two premises: either the ―time one‖ executive alone most accurately
represents the national interest, or the courts exceed their congressional
mandate by incorporating CIL norms.
Equating U.S. interests with the current policies of the executive
branch is a simple solution harmonious with IR realism. Indeed, ―time
one‖ executive primacy in foreign affairs, as articulated by scholars and
courts, owes a great deal to the persuasiveness of realism. 175 The President
alone is elected by the entire nation and can best be said to represent its
overall interests.176 But if we are to accept the ―time one‖ executive
definition of the national interest, we must also accept that the separation
of powers in itself has always imposed massive inefficiency upon the
pursuit of those interests abroad. The United States has never strictly
spoken ―with one voice‖ in foreign affairs.177 The Constitution‘s text
allocates foreign affairs powers to both the Congress and the President.178
In practice, Congress has disagreed with the President, even regarding
highly sensitive national security matters.179 Congress and the ―time zero‖
executive can bind the ―time one‖ executive through legislation that
provides courts with a role, such as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA).180 And the courts have, from the very beginning, rejected

173. See Nzelibe, Partisan Logic, supra note 95, at 3.
174. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694, 714 (2004) (concluding that Congress
would not have intended for the ATS to be ―stillborn,‖ providing jurisdiction but no causes of action);
Nzelibe, Partisan Logic, supra note 95, at 3 (exploring ATS litigation through the lens of distributive
domestic politics and observing that Democratic administrations are more likely than Republican
administrations to use ―expansive judicial interpretation in human rights controversies as an effective
partisan entrenchment strategy to lock in their preferred ideological objectives‖).
175. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 125.
176. See Ku & Yoo, Hamdan, supra note 134.
177. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the „One Voice‟ Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations,
46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975–76 (2001).
178. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 92.
179. Nzelibe, supra note 138, at 965–66 (discussing examples).
180. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (2006) (transferring the determination of sovereign immunity from
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executive branch interpretations of treaties.181 Although the separation of
powers has been criticized as interfering with the ability of the United
States to form a unified foreign policy, this is the government that the
Constitution created.182 If any limit on ―time one‖ executive power in
foreign affairs imposes sovereignty costs, ATS litigation represents a very
minor problem.
This is probably why the revisionist critique largely ignores Congress
and focuses on the perils of rogue courts, invoking their institutional
deficiencies: decentralized and slow decision making, lack of flexibility,
lack of democratic accountability, and lack of expertise.183 This alleged
judicial incompetence in foreign affairs—perhaps combined with a desire
to further the internationalist project of a global rule of law—will,
according to revisionist predictions, lead courts to exceed their ATS
mandate and incorporate exogenous norms.
But there is no evidence that this has happened. As Sosa makes clear,
ATS litigation does not operate as a wholesale incorporation of CIL into
the domestic legal framework.184 ATS litigation is an evolving hybrid:
international law supplies the norm that the defendant is alleged to have
violated, but other rules of decision are more likely to come from domestic
law.185 Because U.S. law tends to take a more expansive view of tort
liability and jurisdiction than international law, the application of U.S.,
rather than international, rules of decision will likely lead to a broader
scope for ATS litigation, rather than the other way around.186 For example,
some courts interpreting the ATS have recognized indirect investor
liability, which is largely unrecognized outside the United States.187
More importantly, Sosa limits the scope of ATS litigation to specific,
universal, and obligatory claims: for violations of norms ―accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of

the executive branch via the State Department to the judiciary).
181. See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical
Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 506–08 (2007) (discussing cases).
182. See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FOREIGN AFF. 126, 128 (1980) (noting
that a shortcoming of the constitutional structure of the United States is the ―inability to ‗form a
government‘‖).
183. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 26; Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 217.
184. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 700–01 (2004) (interpreting the ATS as a
jurisdictional statute that nonetheless makes actionable violations of a limited set of CIL norms).
185. William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for Violations of
International Law, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 639 (2006); see also Lee, supra note 42, at 882 (concluding
that the ―common law . . . supplied the right to sue and defined the elements of the cause of action; the
international law reference was necessary only to identify when aliens were entitled to sue‖).
186. Ramsey, supra note 57, at 321.
187. See id.
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the 18th-century paradigms,‖ such as violations of safe conduct,
infringements of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.188 Lower courts
have recognized contemporary analogues as including prohibitions on
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, torture, summary
execution, disappearance, and forced labor.189 There is very little question
that these norms are identical to norms that are already part of U.S.
domestic law.190
ATS litigation can only be said to impose sovereignty costs if it
requires a change in the domestic authority structure because of the
influence of some outside actor, such as another nation or an international
elite. If courts are applying norms in ATS litigation that are
simultaneously international and domestic, no change is required and there
is no sovereignty cost.
In the future, courts could recognize norms under the ATS that are
truly exogenous in that their separate existence as part of domestic U.S.
law is in serious dispute. But such instances are likely to be very rare.
Although U.S. power may decline relative to that of other nations, the U.S.
will, for the foreseeable future, still exercise considerable influence over
the development of CIL, despite divergence from Europe, the rise of
powers in Asia, and the increased role of international elites.191 It is hard to
imagine a U.S. court recognizing a universal, specific, and obligatory CIL
norm that does not also find parallel support in U.S. domestic law. Even
when judges disagree among themselves about whether a particular norm
meets the universal, specific, and obligatory ATS threshold, this does not
mean that the norm at issue does not have a long-established analogue in
U.S. domestic law. For example, in a Second Circuit ATS case involving

188. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724–25.
189. See id. at 762 (Breyer, J., concurring in part) (crimes against humanity); Doe v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2002) (forced labor); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847
(11th Cir. 1996) (torture); Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide and war
crimes); Hilao v. Estate of Marcos (In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig.), 25 F.3d
1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994) (summary execution); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D.
Mass. 1995) (summary execution and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
694 F. Supp. 707, 709 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (disappearance).
190. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2006) (prohibiting genocide); 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2006)
(prohibiting sale into involuntary servitude); 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2006) (prohibiting forced labor); 18
U.S.C. § 2340 (2006) (prohibiting torture).
191. See Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1193, 1210, 1227–29
(2005) (noting that ―the United States has historically been a major proponent and progenitor of
international law norms‖ and discussing U.S. influence over international economic law); Sarah
Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT‘L L. 1, 102 (2006) (―The United States was
the primary instigator behind the establishment of the UN system and the creation of modern
international treaties ranging from human rights and humanitarian law to international intellectual
property and international trade.‖).
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allegations that Pfizer conducted experimental drug trials on Nigerians
without their consent, the majority concluded that a norm against
nonconsensual human medical experimentation met the Sosa threshold,
while the dissent vigorously disagreed.192 Nonetheless, the norm
prohibiting nonconsensual experimentation has long been a part of U.S.
law.193
In addition, as U.S. power declines, any sovereignty costs from
complying with Sosa-threshold CIL would also decline.194 This means that
the more likely the U.S. courts are to incorporate exogenous norms by
adhering to Sosa, the less likely that incorporation is to impose significant
sovereignty costs. And a safety valve exists because the political branches
possess the power to override judicial overreaching through legislation.
This solution imposes its own efficiency costs, but reduces the risk that
exogenous CIL norms could be locked in domestically.195
Finally, the indeterminate nature of much of contemporary CIL—
decried by revisionists—actually reduces the risk of sovereignty costs.196
Indeterminacy in CIL empowers the U.S. judges interpreting that law, not
the foreign actors and international elites making the law. The more
indeterminate the law, the less norms can truly be called exogenous. Much
of the concern about sovereignty costs is actually misplaced concern about
judicial lawmaking.
2. Foreign Policy Costs
Revisionists also contend that ATS litigation imposes serious costs on
the pursuit of U.S. economic and security interests abroad.197 For the most
part, criticism has consisted of speculation about future consequences,
rather than past or present effects, of ATS litigation. But the concern is
that human rights advocates driving ATS litigation may pursue goals at

192. Compare Abdullahi v. Pfizer, 562 F.3d 163, 177–87 (2d Cir. 2009) (majority holding that the
norm against nonconsensual medical experimentation was universal, specific, and obligatory), with id.
at 194–95 (Wesley, J., dissenting) (contending that the norm was not enforceable against private actors
under customary international law).
193. See id. at 182 (majority opinion) (noting that the norm has been embedded in U.S. law for
forty-five years, and citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(i)).
194. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 26 (concluding that the U.S. faces the highest sovereignty costs
from complying with CIL because of its predominant geopolitical position).
195. Cf. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1226 (noting the difficulty of political branch
override given the numerous veto points in enacting legislation).
196. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 27; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 466–68.
197. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 36–39; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 472–73; McGinnis &
Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1.
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odds with U.S. strategic interests.198 Revisionists point out that crucial
U.S. allies, such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Pakistan,
often have troubling human rights records.199 ATS lawsuits against
government officials or citizens of these allies, or potential rivals like
China, could produce resentment against perceived meddling in their
internal affairs.200 This resentment could in turn impose additional costs on
the pursuit of U.S. strategic goals. Curtis Bradley argues that ATS
litigation has an incremental effect, creating ―[s]trains in international
relationships‖ that ―may undermine a variety of cooperative ventures,
ranging from trade, to environmental protection, to the war on drugs, to
arms control, to combating terrorism.‖201
In addition, critics argue that ATS litigation imposes, or will impose,
significant economic costs on the United States.202 In the event of
judgments against foreign governments, private U.S.-based lenders and
insurers of those countries‘ debts face exposure. Judgments against
corporations with U.S. ties doing business in other countries will prompt
disinvestment, dampening commerce. Other companies not reachable
through ATS litigation will fill the gap, leaving U.S. companies at a
disadvantage and harming U.S. competitiveness.203
These predictions could turn out to be true, but there is little evidence
that ATS litigation has thus far produced significant economic and
security costs. Until the Bush administration, the executive branch
generally supported, or was indifferent to, ATS litigation.204 In 1997, a
California district court asked the Clinton administration about the foreign

198. Abebe, supra note 4, at 29; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 467; McGinnis & Somin,
Political Economy, supra note 4, at 1.
199. Abebe, supra note 4, at 30–31.
200. Id. at 33–34.
201. Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 460.
202. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 1–2.
203. Id. at 13–17; see, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Council for Int‘l Bus., Business Groups Urge
Supreme Court to Curtail Abuse of Alien Tort Statute (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.uscib.
org/index.asp?documentID=2815 (quoting Thomas Niles, president of the United States Council for
International Business: ―Misuse of the Alien Tort Statute has begun to spin out of control in the federal
courts. Not only does this clog up our judicial system, it threatens to make it virtually impossible for
companies, foreign or American, to invest anywhere in the world for fear that they will be subjected to
frivolous lawsuits in U.S. courts‖).
204. In Filartiga, the Carter administration, in amicus, supported the litigation as consistent with
America‘s responsibility to promote human rights internationally. See Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 22, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 79-6090)
(―Like many other areas affecting international relations, the protection of fundamental human rights is
not committed exclusively to the political branches of government.‖). See generally Beth Stephens,
Upsetting Checks and Balances: The Bush Administration‟s Efforts to Limit Human Rights Litigation,
17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 169 (2004).
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affairs implications of the Unocal case, and the administration indicated
that ―adjudication of the claims based on allegations of torture and slavery
would not prejudice or impede the conduct of U.S. foreign relations with
the current government of Burma.‖205 In 2001, however, the Bush
administration changed course, filing a new statement of interest in
Unocal objecting to the lawsuit, the start of a generally disapproving
approach toward ATS litigation.206 This approach may have been driven in
part by ideology and strong views of executive branch primacy.207 But
there are functionalist justifications for the change in attitude toward ATS
lawsuits, which in the 1980s and most of the 1990s ―involved abuses
committed under regimes that were defunct and repudiated by their
successors, nearly universally shunned by other governments, possessed
of, at best, uncertain claims to statehood or legitimate state power, lacking
in geopolitical significance, politically unimportant to Washington, or
clearly condemned by the United States.‖208 The first decade of the
twenty-first century, by contrast, has seen a wave of ATS lawsuits against
corporations and existing regimes that have prompted complaints from
some foreign governments, including U.S. allies.209
The actual effect of ATS litigation on U.S. strategic interests is a very
complex empirical question that deserves comprehensive attention, but is a
project well beyond the scope of this Article. However, it is worth looking
at two examples of recent ATS litigation with the greatest potential to
affect U.S. interests abroad.
The first example involves lawsuits against Chinese officials for human
rights abuses, which present a critical case study for determining the
foreign policy costs of ATS litigation.210 China has the most important and
205. Nat‘l Coal. Gov‘t of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 335 (C.D. Cal.
1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. See Supplemental Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae at 11–15, Doe I
v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628).
207. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 124–44.
208. Jacques deLisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A “Sinical” Look at
the Use of U.S. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 477–78
(2002).
209. See John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien
Tort Statute And Other Approaches, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 1, 8 (2007) (former counsel to
Secretary of State, explaining that other countries see the U.S. ―as something of a rogue actor‖ because
of ATS litigation); see, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2010); Abdullahi v.
Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that a case against Pfizer alleging
nonconsensual medical experimentation on children in Nigeria could go forward under the ATS); Sarei
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008).
210. See, e.g., Zhou v. Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d 255, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp.
2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2000).
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perhaps the most volatile bilateral relationship with the United States.211
China is a rising power and, some argue, a potential rival for geopolitical
dominance.212 Due to its role as a major U.S. creditor, China holds some
leverage over U.S. foreign policy.213 Moreover, China may be particularly
sensitive to ATS litigation. The governing Communist Party of China
(CPC) has proven especially skillful at invoking the long history of
imperialism and abuses by Western countries to stoke the fires of
nationalism and resentment against the United States.214 ATS litigation is
arguably more likely to impose substantial foreign policy costs in this
context than in any other.
Only five ATS lawsuits have been brought concerning activities in
China. Three were dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, one ended in
settlement, and one resulted in a declaratory judgment with no damages
awarded. One suit was brought by student leaders of the 1989 Tiananmen
Square protests against Li Peng, the former Premier of China, for alleged
human rights abuses.215 Former prisoners also brought suit against Li
Peng, various state entities, and the Adidas Corporation for human rights
abuses, including forced prison labor.216 Although the service of the
complaint on Li Peng during a visit to the United States prompted angry
denunciations from the Chinese government, both claims against
government officials were dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds.217
Three other cases arose from the 1999 crackdown by the Chinese
government on the Falun Gong spiritual movement.218 Falun Gong
practitioners filed lawsuits against three Chinese government officials,
including former President Jiang Zemin, the Beijing Mayor, Deputy
Governor of Liaoning Province, and the Chinese Communist Party
Secretary for Sichuan Province.219 Two cases were dismissed on sovereign

211. deLisle, supra note 208, at 492.
212. See G. John Ikenberry, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System
Survive?, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 23 (2008) [hereinafter Ikenberry, China].
213. See Victor Fleischer, A Theory of Taxing Sovereign Wealth, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 486
(2009). However, China‘s ownership of U.S. debt can also be seen as limiting China‘s options,
because China owns far too much in U.S. currency to sell off a significant amount without reducing
the value of its remaining dollar-dominated assets. See WAYNE M. MORRISON & MARC LABONTE,
CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., RL34314, CHINA‘S HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
U.S. ECONOMY 9 (2008).
214. Abebe, supra note 4, at 37–38.
215. Zhou, 286 F. Supp. 2d at 257.
216. Ge v. Peng, 201 F. Supp. 2d 14, 17 (D.D.C. 2000).
217. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 33–46 (discussing the ATS cases involving China).
218. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Beijing in Battle With Sect: „A Giant Fighting a Ghost,‟ N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2001, at A1.
219. See Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620 (7th Cir. 2004); Weixum v. Xilai, 568 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C.

2011]

A REALIST DEFENSE

1153

immunity grounds.220 In another, Doe v. Qi, the defendant refused to
appear and the court issued a declaratory judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs without awarding damages because it ―pose[d] the least threat to
foreign relations.‖221 More recently, in 2007, several Chinese dissidents
sued Yahoo! under the ATS, alleging that the internet company had
supplied information to the Chinese government about the dissidents,
which led to their arrest, imprisonment, and torture.222 No Chinese
government officials were sued. Yahoo! has settled one of the suits for an
undisclosed sum.223
The U.S. State Department filed statements of interest in these cases on
behalf of the defendant Chinese officials, arguing that the litigation would
interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.224 For its part, the
Chinese government complained to the court that the lawsuit would cause
―immeasurable interferences‖225 to U.S.-China relations, denounced the
lawsuits in public, and complained to executive branch officials in private
meetings.226 But what actual foreign policy impact did the ATS cases
have? The lawsuits ended without requiring anything tangible from the
Chinese defendants. On the other hand, even the filing of a lawsuit against
foreign officials arguably implicates foreign policy.227 The service of
papers on Chinese officials while in the United States caused irritation and
tirades.228 The declaratory judgment in Doe v. Qi, and even the fact that
U.S. law permits courts to entertain the ATS claims in the first place,

2008); Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v. Zemin, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 875 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
220. See Ye, 383 F.3d at 630; Weixum, 568 F. Supp. 2d at 35.
221. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1302.
222. Second Amended Complaint for Tort Damages at 4, Xiaoning v. Yahoo! Inc., No. C0702151 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2007), available at http://casedocs.justia.com/california/candce/4:2007
cv02151/191339/51/0.pdf.
223. Catherine Rampell, Yahoo Settles with Chinese Families, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2007, at D4.
224. Statement of Interest of the United States at 7, Doe v. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1258 (N.D. Cal.
2004) (No. C02-0672), available at http://www.cja.org/downloads/LiuQi_Statement_of_Interest
_of_the_US_85.pdf; Statement of Interest of the United States at 2–3, Zhou v. Peng, 286 F. Supp. 2d
255 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No. 00 Civ. 6446), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
16671.pdf (arguing that the Tiananmen Square litigation ―severely hampers the ability of the United
States to implement a robust foreign policy at a time when matters of war and peace are in the
balance‖).
225. Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (quoting Statement of the Government of the People‘s Republic
of China on ―Falun Gong‖ Unwarranted Lawsuits 1–2 (Sept. 2002)).
226. See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 207–19; Qi, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 1300 (quoting Statement of the
Government of the People‘s Republic of China on ―Falun Gong‖ Unwarranted Lawsuits 1–2 (Sept.
2002)); China Says Falungong Lawsuit on Beijing's Mayor is a “Nasty Trick,” AGENCE FR. PRESSE,
Feb. 10, 2002.
227. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 29.
228. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 94–102.
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could be said to cause dignitary harm and Chinese resentment of the
United States.229
But in the end, there is no empirical evidence that the Chinese
government altered any policy toward the United States because of the
lawsuits or that ATS litigation persists as a diplomatic problem. Nor is
there evidence that ATS litigation is a significant motivation for
anti-American sentiment among the Chinese population.
Indeed, there could be several reasons why the ATS lawsuits involving
China had little effect. A pure realist perspective offers a straightforward
answer: the Chinese government is, like the United States, a rational actor
pursuing material interests. If it serves China‘s interests for it to retaliate
against the U.S. for ATS litigation, it will do so; otherwise, it won‘t. China
may have calculated that it was not worth the cost of taking substantive
action beyond diplomatic protestations and stern letters. The
Sino-American relationship is dense and involves interaction on a broad
range of subjects at multiple levels. Given that both governments have
bigger fish to fry, it seems unlikely that these lawsuits have caused any
significant friction. Moreover, Chinese government officials are savvy
enough to view the ATS lawsuits through the lens of the operation of the
U.S. separation of powers rather than as intrusive action by a unitary U.S.
government.230 In addition, the allegations against Chinese officials and
the declaratory judgment in Qi do not depart significantly from
assessments about human rights in China already made by the U.S.
executive branch through the State Department‘s Country Reports.231 U.S.
courts have also made negative assessments about China‘s human rights
record in other litigation, such as asylum cases.232 If China wishes to
retaliate for being accused of violating human rights norms, it already
would be doing so absent ATS litigation. Finally, China actually stands to
benefit in some respects from ATS litigation. Chinese citizens can sue
foreign corporations or government officials for human rights violations
without requiring the Chinese government to address the human rights
issue.233

229. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 37–38.
230. deLisle, supra note 208, at 546 & n.211 (listing examples of Chinese government officials
discussing the U.S. separation of powers and lobbying the executive branch to overturn court
decisions).
231. See id. at 501–02.
232. See id.
233. See id. at 495–96 (noting the favorable treatment in the Chinese press regarding an ATS
lawsuit by Chinese citizens against the government of Japan for sexual abuse during World War II).
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In sum, it is very difficult to conclude that ATS litigation against
Chinese defendants has had any significant effect on U.S. foreign policy.
This suggests that courts are capable of managing ATS litigation in a
manner that avoids imposing costs on the pursuit of U.S. strategic interests
abroad, at least to the extent that ATS litigation risks antagonizing rival
great powers. Each bilateral relationship is unique, of course, and the value
of China as a critical case study is open to debate.
What about antagonizing U.S. allies? In 2002, a group of South African
citizens sued several multinational corporations under the ATS, including
Ford, Daimler, IBM, Fujitsu, and two international banks that did business
with the South African government during Apartheid.234 The alleged
harms included discriminatory employment practices, arbitrary
denationalization, torture, and extrajudicial killing.235 These controversial
lawsuits are frequently mentioned as a prime example of ATS litigation
interfering with the conduct of foreign relations and sparking resentment
in target countries for meddling in their internal affairs.236 The United
Kingdom, Switzerland, and Australia, whose corporations were sued by
the South African plaintiffs, voiced their opposition to the litigation.237
The U.S. and South African governments initially argued that the cases
should be dismissed, but the South African government has since switched
its position to support the lawsuit, and the Obama administration‘s
position is unclear.238
234. The district court granted the defendants‘ motion to dismiss in November 2004. See Ntsebeza
v. Citigroup, Inc. (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff‟d in
part, vacated in part, remanded sub nom. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat‘l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d
Cir. 2007). The Bush administration had urged that it be dismissed, citing, in part, these economic
concerns. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text. After a partial reversal and remand by the
Second Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari but affirmed by default for lack of a quorum, due
to recusal by justices. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008). On remand, the
district court narrowed the claims but allowed the case to continue against Daimler, Ford, General
Motors, IBM, and Rheinmetall Group. See Ntsebeza v. Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.),
617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
235. See Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 255.
236. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger III, The U.S. Can‟t Be the World‟s Court, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2009, at A19.
237. Australia, Switzerland, and the U.K. objected to the Apartheid litigation in an amicus brief in
Sosa. Brief for Governments of the Commonwealth of Australia, the Swiss Confederation, and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petitioner,
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339) [hereinafter Brief of the Governments of
the Commonwealth of Australia], available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/docs/sva19.pdf.
238. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1–2, Ntsebeza v.
Daimler AG (In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig.), 617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 09-2778-CV),
available at http://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/soisouthafricanapartheid litigation.pdf
(declining to support an interlocutory appeal, under the collateral order doctrine, from the district
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Yet there is no evidence that the litigation has so far resulted in
disinvestment or harmed the U.S. relationship with its allies who
intervened against the lawsuit. It is difficult to see how ATS litigation
could disincentivize current investment in South Africa. As long as South
Africa remains a democratic state that does not repress its citizens,
corporations will not risk ATS liability for their present or future
activities. Nor, for that matter, will disinvestment have any effect on
corporations‘ liability for Apartheid-era activities.239 It is possible, of
course, that the litigation in South Africa, and other similar lawsuits, could
discourage corporations from investing in other nations with poor human
rights records for fear of liability.240 This is an empirical question, and no
study has attempted to determine the weight MNCs actually give to ATS
litigation in general as a factor in making global investment decisions.
And the critics‘ concern assumes, of course, that MNCs will do business
with a regime that is currently engaged in human rights violations to the
point that it could be considered aiding and abetting. It costs nothing for
MNCs to claim that ATS litigation is a factor in their decisions, but money
speaks louder than words and investment continues apparently unabated.
Regardless of ATS litigation‘s effects on human rights—which critics
and defenders dispute241—disinvestment in nations with poor human rights
records does not necessarily harm U.S. strategic interests. Critics of ATS
litigation invoke U.S. security and economic interests, but they are not
synonymous with the interests of foreign citizens who might benefit from
the investment or, for that matter, from the interests of U.S.-based MNCs,
who might suffer from the inability to invest in potential ATS target
countries but might just as profitably invest their money elsewhere. The
most compelling observation by revisionists is that MNCs lacking the
contacts with the United States necessary for personal jurisdiction would
be able to invest without consequences, while MNCs with U.S. ties would
be disadvantaged by potential liability.242 In short, ATS litigation increases
the cost of doing business in the United States.
In the end, however, there is simply no significant empirical evidence
that the United States has borne economic costs from ATS litigation. Gary
court‘s order denying defendant‘s motion to dismiss, and arguing that the U.S. government had never
explicitly requested dismissal).
239. See Affidavit of Joseph Stiglitz, South African Apartheid Litigation (on file with author).
240. This was the argument made by the Bush administration in its 2007 Statement of Interest. See
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Defendant-Appellees at 21, Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat. Bank, Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007) (No. 05-2141-CV).
241. I address the human rights costs and benefits in Part II.C.3.
242. HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 41–42.
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Clyde Hufbauer and Nicholas Mitrokostas predicted in 2003 that ATS
litigation could depress worldwide U.S. trade by 10%, lead to a loss of
25% of foreign direct investment in target countries, and cost the United
States hundreds of thousands of manufacturing jobs.243 But these
catastrophic predictions—including a ―nightmare‖ scenario of a $26
billion class action by 100,000 Chinese plaintiffs within the decade—have
not materialized. Again, there is no evidence that companies have actually
disinvested due to the ATS litigation that has occurred. Yahoo! sold its
Chinese subsidiary before the lawsuits were filed but retains a 40%
interest in the purchaser.244 Shell and Chevron have continued to make
multiyear, multibillion dollar investments in Nigeria despite defending
ATS lawsuits concerning their activities in that country. 245 Because almost
all multinational corporations operating in developing countries are
subject to U.S. jurisdiction and reachable by ATS litigation, there are
relatively few nonreachable companies able to step in.246
Why has the ATS failed after 30 years to cause an economic
earthquake unsettling the global trading system? The gloomiest
predictions assume that governments will face staggering judgments and
that corporations can be held liable merely for doing business in a target
country.247 But these assumptions do not reflect the reality of ATS
litigation as it has actually unfolded. Merely investing in a country that has
an authoritarian regime has never been sufficient ground for liability under
the ATS.248 In fact, corporate aiding and abetting liability is becoming
more difficult to prove. In 2010, the Second Circuit—which, along with

243. See id. at 38–40.
244. Yahoo Chief Apologizes to Chinese Dissidents‟ Relatives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/07/business/worldbusiness/07iht-yahoo.1.8226586.html.
245. See Herz, supra note 6, at 212. Talisman Energy, a Canadian corporation, sold its interest in
the Sudan oil pipeline project in 2002, but a senior manager at the company, without reference to the
ATS, attributed the decision to a public relations campaign mounted by its critics resulting in a bill
introduced in Congress that would have delisted Talisman from the New York Stock Exchange. Reg
Manhas, Talisman in Sudan: Impacts of Divestment (Mar. 16, 2007), http://www.enewsbuilder.net/
globalcompact/e_article000775162.cfm?x=b11,0,w.
246. See Michael Barsa & David Dana, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of Corporate Social
Responsibility by Means of the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court‟s Incoherent Conception of the
Law of Nations, the “Purposive” Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and the State Action
Requirement for Primary Liability, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2010). As Barsa and Dana
observe, even if companies not subject to U.S. jurisdiction step in, the threat of disinvestment by
companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction is likely to give target countries an incentive to improve human
rights conditions because reduced competition will lead to fewer benefits for the target country. See id.
This would, in turn, make it more likely that companies subject to U.S. jurisdiction would maintain
investment.
247. See HUFBAUER & MITROKOSTAS, supra note 4, at 1–2.
248. Herz, supra note 6, at 210.
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the Ninth Circuit, is considered to be the most friendly to ATS plaintiffs—
held, in a surprising decision, that jurisdiction under the ATS did not
extend to lawsuits against corporations at all.249
Without a doubt, the Supreme Court‘s recognition in Sosa that crafting
remedies for new CIL norms ―would raise risks of adverse foreign policy
consequences‖ has led to restraint by judges in subsequent ATS cases.250
Facing a high bar for success under the ATS, plaintiffs and their attorneys
are relatively more selective in filing lawsuits than they otherwise would
have been.251
ATS litigation could, in the future, threaten to impose serious foreign
policy costs. But one cannot presume that federal courts will ignore
specific evidence of those costs presented to them, or that the political
branches will be unwilling to intervene if necessary through legislative
override. The courts have thus far managed litigation without imposing
such costs. Why will they not continue to do so in the future? And further,
should courts actually ―go rogue,‖ there are few reasons to think that
Congress and the President will reign in ATS litigation if they think it
necessary for the national interest. National security concerns motivated
swift passage of the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Act in response to Supreme Court decisions in 2004 and
2006.252 Multinational corporations, for good or ill, have enormous ability

249. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010). The decision was surprising
to observers because other courts had held the opposite, and the Second Circuit had decided earlier
ATS cases against corporations while assuming that corporations could be liable. See id. at 124;
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009) (―In addition to private individual
liability, we have also recognized corporate defendants are subject to liability under the ATS and may
be liable for violations of the law of nations.‖ (citing Romero v. Drummond Co., Inc., 552 F.3d 1303,
1315 (11th Cir.2008))); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that aiding
and abetting liability against a corporation can be proven if the defendant provided ―knowing practical
assistance or encouragement that has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the crime‖); AlQuraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753 (D. Md. 2010) (―There is no basis for differentiating
between private individuals and corporations [under the ATS] . . . .‖).
250. See Stephens, supra note 55, at 18 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727–28
(2004)).
251. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 97–98.
252. The Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001–1005, 119 Stat. 2680,
2739–44 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.
(2006)), purported to strip habeas jurisdiction for Guantánamo detainees and replace it with exclusive,
but limited, review of Combatant Status Review Tribunal proceedings in the D.C. Circuit. The DTA
was in part a response to Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004), which held that alien detainees at
Guantánamo had a statutory right to invoke habeas jurisdiction. Id. The Military Commissions Act
(MCA), Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950w and scattered
sections of 10 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C. (2006)), inter alia, reestablished the
military commissions and eliminated habeas corpus for all aliens designated as ―enemy combatants‖ or
awaiting a determination of that status. The MCA was a response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 567 (2006), which declared as unlawful the military commissions established to try certain enemy
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to spur the passage of legislation when their interests are seriously
threatened.
3. Human Rights Costs
Revisionists acknowledge that nations like the United States will, from
time to time, rationally pursue human rights as a preference.253 From a
realist perspective, however, human rights will (and normatively, must)
ultimately take a back seat to more important material interests, primarily
security.254 Indeed, while the United States has long professed that the
increased global observance of human rights is an important foreign policy
goal, it has often allied itself with repressive regimes to advance other
interests.255 The revisionist critique assumes that the only instrumental use
of ATS litigation is to further the U.S. interest in the establishment of a
global human rights regime. Professors Ku and Yoo speculate that the
purpose of the ATS is to advance the development of international human
rights law.256 Professor Abebe associates ATS litigation with the
―normative project to judicialize international politics, integrate
international law into domestic legal systems, and promote progressive
change.‖257 Their revisionist critique focuses on the conflict between these
progressive goals and the positive reality of an international system
sensitive to power.
But revisionists also advance another objection: that ATS litigation
fails to achieve its purpose of promoting adherence to human rights
principles.258 Indeed, by focusing on only the human rights benefits and
the realist and security costs, revisionists can argue that ATS litigation is
simultaneously ineffectual and capable of creating havoc. Revisionists
point to the low number of collectable damage awards as evidence that
ATS litigation fails to bring restitution to victims of human rights abuses
while making international law seem empty.259 Yet even judgments for the
plaintiffs, revisionists argue, are not likely to result in the internalization of
international human rights law in target countries. Instead, ATS litigation

combatants for war crimes and held that the courts retained habeas jurisdiction over claims filed by
Guantánamo detainees before the DTA took effect. Id.
253. Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 118, at 463.
254. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 29–32.
255. See id.
256. Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 116–18; see also Abebe, supra note 4, at 25.
257. Abebe, supra note 4, at 15.
258. See McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra note 4, at 38–40; see also Abebe, supra
note 4, at 26.
259. Abebe, supra note 4, at 45–46.
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is more likely to make international law appear as the instrument of
neocolonialism by a foreign power whose government officials are
shielded by sovereign immunity from similar accountability. Finally, the
availability of ATS litigation will tend to discourage the development of
local justice.260
These adverse human rights consequences seem entirely plausible, but
they are difficult to measure, and there is plenty of countervailing
evidence. Although approximately only two dozen ATS suits have
survived to judgment and collectable damage awards have been few,261
corporate defendants have begun to settle some high-visibility ATS suits.
In 2009, ―pharmaceutical manufacturer Pfizer reached a settlement with
the plaintiffs in a multibillion dollar ATS suit by numerous Nigerian
children and their guardians. The plaintiffs alleged that the company
conducted illegal clinical trials of . . . an experimental meningitis
medication[] on [the] children . . . without approval by Nigeria or the
children‘s parents.‖262 Pfizer settled after the Second Circuit held that
nonconsensual experimentation was a CIL norm actionable under the
ATS.263 The same year, a $15.5 million settlement was reached on the eve
of trial in a long-running suit against ―Royal Dutch Shell, its Nigerian
subsidiary, and the former head of Shell‘s Nigerian operations [for]
complicit[y] in murder, torture, and other crimes in connection with
Shell‘s operations in the Niger Delta.‖264 And, as mentioned above,
Yahoo! recently settled a suit brought by Chinese dissidents.265 Such

260. See id. Professors McGinnis and Somin add the additional argument that the prospect of
losing all ill-gotten wealth through ATS litigation encourages dictators to hold onto power longer so
that they can continue to enjoy sovereign immunity. See McGinnis & Somin, Political Economy, supra
note 4, at 39–40. Former government officials are not generally protected by sovereign immunity. See,
e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2282 (2010) (holding that the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act did not shield a former Somali government official from ATS and TVPA lawsuits by
Somali citizens alleging torture and human rights violations committed while the defendant was in
government).
261. As of 2010, two judgments were awarded against a corporate defendant and twenty-two
cases resulted in judgments against non-corporate defendants, thirteen of which were default
judgments. See Susan Simpson & Michael Williams, Alien Tort Statute Cases Resulting in Plaintiff
Victories, THE VIEW FROM LL2 (Nov. 11, 2009), available at http://viewfromll2.com/2009/11/11/
alien-tort-statute-cases-resulting-in-plaintiff-victories/.
262. John R. Crook, Major Corporations Settle Alien Tort Statute Cases Following Adverse
Appellate Rulings, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 592, 592 (2009).
263. Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., 562 F.3d 163, 187 (2d Cir. 2009); Joe Stephens, Suits Saying Pfizer
Experimented on Nigerian Children Are Revived, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2009, at A7.
264. Crook, supra note 262, at 593. The claims focused on Shell‘s alleged role in Nigeria‘s 1995
execution of Nigerian activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni activists opposed to
Shell's environmental practices in the delta. See Jad Mouawad, Shell Agrees to Settle Abuse Case for
Millions, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B1.
265. Rampell, supra note 223.
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settlements may not carry the same weight as jury verdicts, but they
provide some indication to the populations in target countries that MNCs
can be held accountable under international law.
Indeed, there is much evidence that ATS litigation improves the
reputation of the United States and temporarily fills in gaps in the justice
systems of target countries.266 Harry Akoh concluded from a study of the
ramifications of ATS litigation in Africa against both corporations and
government officials ―that the ATS has enhanced the image of the United
States as a purveyor of human rights‖ and that many Africans ―have a
sincere appreciation for the United States as a place where they can seek
justice against those who would otherwise never be challenged in their
own countries.‖267 Dolly Filartiga wrote that her ATS suit provided an
otherwise unavailable means of accountability and brought attention to the
atrocities of the Stroessner regime in Paraguay, where her brother became
a martyr for human rights.268
Because of the higher bar for identifying specific, universal, and
obligatory human rights norms, ATS suits are more likely to target activity
in nations with repressive regimes, where justice systems are
underdeveloped and accountability for human rights abuses—against both
government officials and MNCs—is lacking. Lawsuits against MNCs are
unlikely to provoke resentment or allegations of neocolonialism in such
contexts because MNCs are themselves viewed by much of the population
as foreign, and sometimes even hostile, elements, particularly if they aid
and abet human rights abuses.269
It is possible that ATS litigation could tend to discourage the
development of local justice and accountability for human rights violations
by interfering with domestic processes already underway, opening old
wounds by reviving resolved conflicts, or giving plaintiffs an alternative
and more attractive means of obtaining relief.270 On the other hand, it
seems equally plausible that ATS litigation could spur the development of
local justice by emulation.271 It may do all of these things, depending on
the target country. The empirical evidence is, again, indeterminate.272

266. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 1, at 124–32.
267. AKOH, supra note 6, at 248.
268. Dolly Filartiga, American Courts, Global Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2004, at A21; see
also Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. Peña-Irala: Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the
Customary International Law Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES 45 (John E.
Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson & Mark W. Janis eds., 2007).
269. See Holzmeyer, supra note 120, at 280.
270. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 35; Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 465.
271. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1222 (9th Cir. 2007) (―An alternative and
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The conflicting incentives for target countries are evident in South
Africa‘s complex response to the Apartheid lawsuit. Although some
prominent South Africans, such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, supported
the litigation, the Mbeke administration objected, arguing to the court that
it infringed on South Africa‘s sovereign right to resolve Apartheid-era
issues through the truth and reconciliation process and would hurt foreign
direct investment in South Africa.273 However, in 2009, the new
administration, led by President Joseph Zuma, reversed course and
supported the ATS litigation.274
In the event that there is a genuine risk that ATS litigation will interfere
with local remedies, the courts can adjust. Following the Supreme Court‘s
hint in Sosa, the Ninth Circuit indicated that district courts should impose
exhaustion requirements in ATS litigation.275 This rule, if followed in
other circuits, would limit interference with ongoing local litigation in
most cases.
Revisionists and the U.S. government have also argued that ATS
litigation against corporations harms target countries by causing
disinvestment, resulting in lost opportunities for MNCs to reinforce human
rights norms through constructive engagement.276 This argument again
assumes, without evidence, that MNCs would forsake investment
opportunities were they not allowed to aid and abet violations of
Sosa-threshold CIL norms. Moreover, as John Herz has argued,
constructive engagement cannot be effective if MNCs are involved in
violating the very human rights norms they seek to promote.277
perhaps equally plausible hypothesis is that ‗foreign court rulings against rights-abusing defendants
have the effect of putting pressure ―from above‖ on the state where the rights abuses occurred.‘‖
(quoting Ellen Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Human
Rights Trials in Latin America, 2 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 1, 4 (2001))); Herz, supra note 6, at 208–09.
272. Herz, supra note 6, at 208–09.
273. Compare Declaration from Penuell Mpapa Maduna, South African Minister of Justice, to
Judge John E. Sprizzo (July 11, 2001), with Supplemental Declaration in Opposition to Defendants‘
Joint Motion to Dismiss by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, In re South Africa Apartheid Litigation, MDL
1499, 02-MD-1499, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13797 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003).
274. See Letter from Jeffrey Thamsanqa Radebe, Minister of Justice & Constitutional Dev., S.
Afr., to the Honorable Shira Scheindlin, U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of N.Y., available at
http://viewfromll2.files.wordpress.com/2009/12/radebeletter.pdf.
275. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 825 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (―As a prudential matter,
in this case there is a certain logic to considering exhaustion before considering threshold grounds that
may ‗deny[] audience to a case on the merits.‘‖ (quoting Sinochem Int‘l Co. v. Malaysia Int‘l Shipping
Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007))).
276. See generally Herz, supra note 6.
277. Id. at 21.
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III. THE STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF ATS LITIGATION
While the revisionist critique focuses on the economic and security
costs of ATS litigation, its defenders have, for the most part, focused on
describing its benefits for the enforcement of human rights norms and the
rule of law.278 These are normatively attractive objectives regardless of
their benefit for the United States. And, to the extent that the United States
pursues these interests for its own sake, the traditional defense of ATS
litigation offers a response to the revisionist critique on its own terms.279
Nonetheless, this response is radically incomplete and leaves ATS
litigation quite vulnerable to realist claims that it undermines U.S. security
interests. In this section, I describe the strategic benefits of ATS litigation.
A. The ATS‟s Strategic Purpose in 1789
The present emphasis on the ATS as a vehicle for the global
judicialization of modern human rights norms obscures its likely original
purpose. The ATS in fact owes its existence to U.S. geopolitical interests
and realist ends. The scant evidence available suggests that the ATS was
enacted to help protect U.S. neutrality in a 1789 world dominated by
stronger European powers.280 For the most part, early American foreign
policy was isolationist, seeking to avoid entanglements with the European
powers that had been warring for centuries.281 The separation of powers
itself was designed in part, or at least served, to institutionalize America‘s
diplomatic isolation.282 The federal courts contributed to this effort.
Professor David Sloss has demonstrated, in a study of early Supreme
Court cases and related materials, that the federal courts played an active
role in implementing U.S. neutrality policy during the 1790s by providing

278. See supra notes 115–26 and accompanying text.
279. But cf. Lee, supra note 42, at 907 (arguing that limiting ATS litigation to safe-conduct
offenses would produce national security benefits and that ―it is entirely consistent with the original
purpose of the ATS to see it as a means to deploy the federal courts in the service of a national security
policy in the best interests of the American people‖ (emphasis added)).
280. Anthony D‘Amato, The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 62, 63 (1988); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
VAND. L. REV. 819, 839 (1989) (―The primary consideration that forced the United States to pay
respect to the law of nations was the country‘s weakness in relation to the European powers.‖); Lee,
supra note 42, at 849.
281. HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMACY 36 (1994).
282. See id.; Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive
Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 678–79 (1998).
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a non-executive-branch forum for the resolution of disputes involving
privateers.283
Two incidents involving assaults on foreign citizens during the 1780s
in the United States likely underscored the need for an ATS. In
Philadelphia, a French citizen named Chevalier De Longchamps—
described by Thomas Jefferson as an ―obscure and worthless
character‖284—had attacked the Secretary of the French Legation at the
house of the French Ambassador and later assaulted the Secretary on the
street.285 The U.S. government lacked the authority to punish Longchamps
and suffered diplomatic humiliation and some international outrage while
waiting for Pennsylvania to prosecute him.286 In the second incident, a
police officer entered the house of the Dutch ambassador in New York and
arrested him, allegedly without cause.287 The ambassador complained to
Secretary of State John Jay, who lamented the lack of a federal remedy. 288
But such risks to American neutrality were not created only by incidents in
the United States. After the enactment of the ATS, Attorney General
William Bradford opined that British property owners in Sierra Leone
could seek damages for harm to their property inflicted during a raid by
French privateers assisted by U.S. slavers.289
Of course, the fact that the ATS almost immediately fell into
hibernation suggests that it was not deemed a very useful tool for serving
its neutrality-preserving purpose. But its mere existence may have
provided some reassurance.
Some revisionists, taking cues from ATS supporters, see the modern
post-Filartiga purpose of the ATS as promoting the development and
enforcement of international law.290 They see this modern purpose as
working against the ATS‘s original purpose by interfering in the internal
affairs of foreign nations.291 But none have considered that the ATS may
serve a beneficial strategic function today.

283. See generally David Sloss, Judicial Foreign Policy: Lessons from the 1790s, 53 ST. LOUIS U.
L.J. 145 (2008).
284. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (May 25, 1784), reprinted in 7 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 288–89 (J. Boyd ed., 1953).
285. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784); see also Sosa v. AlvarezMachain, 542 U.S. 692, 617–18 (discussing the incident).
286. See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts‟ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in
Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 489, 491–94 (1986).
287. See id.
288. Secretary for Foreign Aff. Rep. on the Compl. of Minister of United Netherlands (Mar. 25,
1788), reprinted in 34 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 109, 111 (1788).
289. Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att‘y Gen. 57 (1795).
290. See Ku & Yoo, Beyond Formalism, supra note 4, at 179–80.
291. Bradley, Costs, supra note 2, at 463.
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B. The ATS‟s Twenty-First Century Strategic Function
How can this strategic purpose of the ATS be made meaningful in
today‘s world? The optimal strategies for a weak power pursuing
neutrality in an eighteenth-century international system dominated by
overseas powers are, of course, different from those of a lone superpower
providing public goods in a twenty-first-century world transformed by
globalization. However, the persistence of ATS litigation, despite this
criticism, suggests not only that the interference argument is overblown,
but also that ATS litigation may serve the contemporary strategic goals of
the United States in slightly different, though related, ways.
A realist assessment of ATS litigation‘s costs and benefits must take
into account the unique role of the United States in the world, which IR
scholars disagree about how best to define. The United States has been
variously described as the lone superpower, a hyperpower,292 a
hegemon,293 and an empire.294 These descriptions have long coexisted with
predictions of more or less imminent U.S. decline.295 In the first half of the
2000s, the already vast United-States-as-empire literature bloomed on both
ends of the political spectrum, in part as a response to the more aggressive
foreign policies of the Bush administration following 9/11.296 During the
second half of the decade, however, the narrative of U.S. decline, and the
rise of its rivals, has gained momentum.297 Many of these disagreements
result from semantic differences and loose use of the term ―empire.‖298 In
addition, assessments of the U.S. global position will vary, depending on

292. See, e.g., Elliot A. Cohen, History and the Hyperpower, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 49 (2004).
293. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, AMERICAN HEGEMONY (1996) (arguing that American hegemony
is a form of international governance and must be evaluated by liberals in the same way they would
evaluate the legitimacy of domestic political arrangements).
294. Nexon & Wright, supra note 9, at 253 (observing that scholars on both the left and right
describe the U.S. as an empire); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq, 82 FOREIGN
AFF. 60, 60 (2003) (same).
295. See MEARSHEIMER, supra note 109, at 381 (arguing that regional hegemons will arise to
challenge American dominance); see also PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT
POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500 TO 2000 (1987) (predicting, in the
first 1987 edition, the decline of the United States).
296. See, e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, COLOSSUS: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE
(2004); CHALMERS JOHNSON, THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE: MILITARISM, SECRECY, AND THE END OF
THE REPUBLIC (2004).
297. See, e.g., PARAG KHANNA, THE SECOND WORLD: EMPIRES AND INFLUENCE IN THE NEW
GLOBAL ORDER (2008); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008) [hereinafter
ZAKARIA, POST-AMERICAN].
298. See, e.g., Nexon & Wright, supra note 9, at 253.
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the importance one places, respectively, on military, economic, and soft
power.299
But a few relatively noncontroversial insights from IR theory can serve
as the foundation for an assessment of ATS litigation‘s strategic benefits.
First, since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has lacked
global balancing rivals in the traditional realist sense: it is the only nation
capable of projecting military power anywhere in the world.300 In this
respect, the United States is the sole superpower and the global system is
unipolar.
There are several reasons why this is likely to continue for some time.
First, the United States is geographically isolated from other potential
rivals, who are located near one another in Eurasia.301 This mutes the
security threat that the United States seems to pose, while increasing the
threats that potential rivals seem to pose to one another.302 Second, the
United States far exceeds the capabilities of all other states in terms of
military and, for the time being, economic power. This advantage ―is
larger now than any analogous gap in the history of the modern states
system.‖303 Finally, the potential rivals‘ possession of nuclear weapons
makes the concentration of power in the United States appear less
threatening. A war between great powers in today‘s world is very
unlikely.304
The United States is also unique in that it provides a number of public
goods for the world.305 These include security guarantees, the protection of
sea lanes, and support for open markets.306 After World War II, the United
States forged a system of military alliances and transnational economic
and political institutions—such as the United Nations, NATO, the

299. See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS, at x
(2004) (observing that the U.S. occupies a different global position with respect to military, economic,
and soft power).
300. See G. John Ikenberry, Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar
Age, 30 REV. INT‘L STUD. 609, 618 (2004) [hereinafter Ikenberry, Liberalism].
301. Potential rivals include China, Europe, Japan, and India. See ZAKARIA, POST-AMERICAN,
supra note 297, at 21.
302. Stephen G. Brooks & William Wohlforth, International Relations Theory and the Case
Against Unilateralism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 509, 511 (2005) [hereinafter Brooks & Wohlforth,
Unilateralism].
303. Id.
304. Stephen G. Brooks & William C. Wohlforth, Hard Times for Soft Balancing, 30 INT‘L
SECURITY 72, 106 (2005).
305. Public goods are ―nonrivalrous,‖ which means capable of being simultaneously consumed by
the provider and others, and ―nonexcludable,‖ which means impossible to keep others from
consuming. McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1236.
306. MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 34–62 (describing the public goods provided by the United
States for the world).
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International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank—that remain in place
today.307 The United States exercises influence through these institutions
and provides security for allies, such as Japan and Germany, by
maintaining a strong military presence in Asia and Europe.308 Because of
its overwhelming military might, the United States possesses what
amounts to a ―quasi-monopoly‖ on the use of force.309 This prevents other
nations from launching wars that would tend to be truly destabilizing for
the international system. Similarly, the United States provides a public
good through its efforts to combat terrorism and confront rogue states.310
The United States does not produce these global public goods from
altruism. As the largest consumer of these goods, it benefits from them the
most.
Of course, the United States supplies these public goods imperfectly.
Pirates prey on shipping in some places (often with impunity), and rogue
states continue to develop nuclear weapons.311 Depending on whether, and
how much, U.S. power declines, its ability or willingness to provide these
goods could one day be in doubt.312 Moreover, there are many important
global public goods—such as addressing ―weakest link‖ collective action
problems like climate change—that the United States cannot provide
alone.313 Nonetheless, assessments of U.S. strategic interests—and the
ability of ATS litigation to advance or hinder those interests—cannot rest
on the assumption that the United States seeks to pursue its interests in the
same way as other nations. America‘s unique role demands unique
strategies.
It should be clear that the ―realist‖ defense I offer here is not purely
realist.314 To see how ATS litigation may be a net strategic benefit, one

307. See id.
308. Id.
309. See Ikenberry, Liberalism, supra note 300, at 618 (―The United States possesses a quasimonopoly on the international use of force while the domestic institutions and [behaviors] of states are
increasingly open to global—that is, American—scrutiny.‖).
310. See, e.g., MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 163 (observing that forceful U.S. measures to
prevent rogue states from acquiring nuclear weapons permitted Europe and China to adopt more
conciliatory postures toward those regimes); see also TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE ACTION
144–61 (2004) (applying public-goods theory to the control of rogue states).
311. See RICHARD RHODES, THE TWILIGHT OF THE BOMBS: RECENT CHALLENGES, NEW
DANGERS, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS (2010); Milena Sterio,
The Somali Piracy Problem: A Global Puzzle Necessitating a Global Solution, 59 AM. U. L. REV.
1449, 1450 (2010).
312. See MANDELBAUM, supra note 33, at 62.
313. See generally Paul G. Harris, Collective Action on Climate Change: The Logic of Regime
Failure, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 195 (2007).
314. For a discussion of international relations realism, see supra notes 103–16 and accompanying
text.
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must accept that international law is not entirely epiphenomenal—that it
does serve some purpose. Again, strict adherence to international relations
neorealism seems to foreclose this possibility.315 However, no revisionist
insists that neorealism in its pure form comprehensively describes all
interactions among nations.316 One can accept the premise that
international law qua international law exerts no independent pull on
nations toward compliance, yet conclude that international law, including
CIL, still serves strategic purposes.
Suppose a state will, from time to time, restrain the exercise of its
power in the short term in order to obtain greater long-term benefits. The
larger a state‘s propensity to restrain short-term action in this way, the
lower its ―discount rate.‖317 Because a tendency for self-restraint makes a
state a better cooperative partner, low-discount-rate states will seek out
other low-discount-rate states.318 How can states signal that they have a
low discount rate? One way is through compliance with human rights
norms. Because it involves only the state‘s treatment of its own citizens, a
state suffers fewer sanctions for failing to comply with human rights
norms than for failing to repay a debt or comply with a trade agreement.
Because it does not tend to get much in return, compliance with human
rights law is generally believed to be costlier for a state.319 For this reason,
complying with human rights law can signal that the state is willing to
engage in self-restraint and that it has a low discount rate.320
Another way to look at the function of complying with human rights
norms is through the lens of reputation.321 States are, at least to some
degree, sensitive to their reputations. They may not value reputation above
military or economic power, but reputation has some value, in part
because it enables states to achieve other things. States can acquire
reputations for a variety of things, from toughness to cooperativeness.322
And a state will also develop a reputation regarding its compliance with

315. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text.
316. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 39; see also GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 14
(describing their approach to international relations as ―institutionalist‖).
317. See David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 NW. U. L. REV.
879, 885–86 (2003).
318. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 100, at 172–74.
319. See Moore, supra note 317, at 886.
320. See Daniel A. Farber, Rights as Signals, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 84–93 (2002); Moore, supra
note 317, at 886.
321. See Richard H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic
Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 674–75 (2001) (book review) (describing theories of signaling as a
refinement of theories of reputation).
322. See generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State‟s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 231
(2009).

2011]

A REALIST DEFENSE

1169

international law.323 A single state‘s reputation will vary a great deal,
depending on the states with whom its reputation is measured and the
subject matter of interactions—such as trade, human rights, and the
environment.324 Similarly, a state‘s reputation for complying with the law
will vary with the type of international legal norm and nations with whom
it has interacted.325 For example, the United States may have a strong
reputation with Canada for complying with free trade agreements, but a
somewhat weaker reputation for compliance with international human
rights law.
Why would states value a reputation for compliance with international
human rights law? This brings us back to the signaling effect. It is
generally in a state‘s interest, all other things being equal, to have a
reputation for complying with international law because it signals it has
characteristics that make it an appealing cooperative partner. A reputation
for cooperativeness reduces the transaction costs for cooperation.
It is also in a state‘s interest to signal cooperativeness in as cheap a way
as possible. One of the ways to accomplish this is to influence the way
norms are defined.326 ―A state that controls the signals that designate lowdiscount types also obtains a degree of influence over the actions of other
states. . . . [and] has the ability to select signals it can send more cheaply
and that help it to identify countries that resemble itself.‖327 A nation that
most influences the content of international human rights norms spends
the fewest resources—and suffers the fewest sovereignty costs—in
signaling cooperativeness through compliance with the human rights
norms it has defined.
Whether and how to signal cooperativeness through compliance with
human rights norms presents a complex problem for the United States. As
the sole superpower in a unipolar world and a provider of global public
goods, the United States has the strength to get its way much of the time,
whether or not it sends cooperative signals.328 For good or ill, no country

323. Guzman, Compliance Theory, supra note 116, at 1837.
324. See id.
325. See id.
326. This process of ―norm definition‖ is, for our realist purposes here, distinct from ―norm
entrepreneurship,‖ the process described by nonrealists like Harold Koh by which norms are created
and internalized by both nations and institutions. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, A United States
Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 316 (2002).
327. Moore, supra note 317, at 892.
328. Andrew Moravcsik, Why Is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in
MULTILATERALISM AND US FOREIGN POLICY 345, 347–49 (Stewart Patrick & Shepard Forman eds.,
2002) (citing geopolitical power as one reason for the United States‘ paradoxical approach toward
international human rights); Johan D. van der Vyver, American Exceptionalism: Human Rights,
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can afford not to deal with the United States. In addition, because the
United States has the greatest power to ignore external constraints, it bears
the highest costs from complying with international human rights
norms.329 This is why the United States often seeks to go its own way
when it comes to human rights agreements.
On the other hand, the United States must place a premium on
cooperativeness because it is the provider of public goods. If other nations
are cooperative, it can provide those public goods more cheaply. For
example, it is much harder for the United States to operate military bases
in nations where anti-American sentiment is higher.330 As the largest
consumer of public goods, the United States benefits the most. Moreover,
there are limits on even America‘s ability to disregard human rights norms
without eventually acquiring a reputation for valuing short-term over longterm interests, and jeopardizing its reputation for cooperativeness. For
example, the abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and the detention
policies associated with Guantánamo harmed America‘s ―brand‖ and
diminished support for U.S. policy abroad.331
The United States, therefore, has three oft-conflicting incentives: it
wants to shape the way in which cooperativeness is signaled through
compliance with international law; it wants to signal cooperativeness itself
to the extent that it can; and yet it wants to avoid the sovereignty costs
from having to comply with human rights norms that are not part of its
domestic law.
One significant benefit of ATS litigation is that it makes it cheaper for
the United States to signal that it is an appealing cooperative partner. ATS
litigation helps the United States signal cooperativeness more cheaply in
three ways. First, because actual litigation involving international human
rights law is rare, many of the issues will be litigated for the first time

International Criminal Justice, and National Self-Righteousness, 50 EMORY L.J. 775, 776–90, 831
(2001) (detailing ways in which the United States has limited the applicability of international human
rights law to itself even as it uses human rights to judge other nations).
329. See Abebe, supra note 4, at 21 (―The United States‘ political, economic, and military
dominance of international politics; the unipolar structure of the international system; and the United
States‘ capacity to comply with and enforce international law consistent with its interests suggests that
the sovereignty cost of incorporating international law will be higher than the cost to any other State in
the international system.‖).
330. See Ryan M. Scoville, A Sociological Approach to the Negotiation of Military Base
Agreements, 14 U. MIAMI INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2006).
331. See STEPHEN HOLMES, THE MATADOR‘S CAPE: AMERICA‘S RECKLESS RESPONSE TO
TERROR 152–53 (2007); Guantánamo‟s Shadow, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2007, ¶ 6, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/10/guantanamo-apos-s-shadow/6212/ (polling a
bipartisan group of leading policy experts and finding 87% believed the U.S. detention system had hurt
the fight against al Qaeda).
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under the ATS. This gives the United States the opportunity to act as a
―norm definer‖ with more influence over the development of that law.332
Other nations or international law scholars may disagree with U.S. courts‘
interpretations of CIL norms in ATS cases, but these decisions doubtless
exert some influence because they establish which international law norms
can be enforced in the courts of the world‘s predominant power. Costs, in
terms of signaling cooperativeness, increase for other nations who violate
norms recognized in ATS litigation.333 Indeed, the desire to signal
cooperativeness may account for other nations‘ surprisingly muted
reactions to ATS litigation. The more closely international law
corresponds to U.S. law, the lower the costs for the United States of
compliance and signaling cooperativeness.334
Second, as defenders of ATS litigation ruefully observe, sovereign
immunity will protect U.S. officials from liability in most
circumstances.335 To the extent foreign government officials are not
similarly protected, this creates an unfair double standard, but also gives
the U.S. government (if not its citizens) the advantage of defining norms
while maintaining the flexibility of not adhering to those norms. In any
event, U.S. citizens and corporations, including the private military
contractors that do a great deal of national security work, are potentially
subject to ATS liability.336 This imposes some compliance costs on the
U.S., but also signals cooperativeness. If U.S. entities are going to be held
liable for violations of CIL, it serves U.S. interests for claims to be heard
in U.S. courts, with law defined by U.S. judges, rather than in alternative
international fora.
Third, ATS litigation expands the range of the signaling instrument.
Just as the Washington administration relied on the federal courts to

332. See Moore, supra note 317, at 889–90.
333. For reasons discussed above, ATS litigation itself imposes few, if any, sovereignty costs on
the United States. See supra Part II.B.1.
334. Cf. Abebe, supra note 4, at 25 (concluding that sovereignty costs from the incorporation of
customary international law are high because it does not reflect state interests but is developed by elite
opinion and nondemocratic processes).
335. See Karen Lin, Note, An Unintended Double Standard of Liability: The Effect of the Westfall
Act on the Alien Tort Claims Act, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1718, 1720 (2008). It is disputed whether the
universal jurisdiction associated with Sosa-threshold norms abrogates sovereign immunity for U.S.
government officials. See Elizabeth A. Wilson, Is Torture All in a Day's Work? Scope of Employment,
the Absolute Immunity Doctrine, and Human Rights Litigation Against U.S. Federal Officials, 6
RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 175, 244–45 (2008).
336. See In re Xe Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569, 592 (E.D. Va. 2009) (granting
leave to amend ATS claims by Iraqi nationals against private security firm); Jenny S. Lam,
Accountability for Private Military Contractors Under the Alien Tort Statute, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1459,
1462 (2009).
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resolve prize disputes between rival powers so that it could maintain a
neutral posture, ATS litigation, by placing some power to interpret human
rights norms with the judiciary, gives the executive branch the flexibility
to send a different signal.337 When other nations understand the U.S.
separation of powers, the executive branch can credibly distance itself
from ATS litigation. The U.S. government as a whole can therefore signal
both general cooperativeness through respect for, and even enforcement
of, international human rights law and more specific cooperativeness via
attention to the interests of the target nation. This ―multi-vocal‖ signaling
enabled by the separation of powers expands the range of strategic options
for signaling cooperativeness.338
A major benefit of ATS litigation lies in its potential for addressing
certain global collective action problems. The protection of human rights
is not always a global public good because even massive human rights
violations in one nation, such as the genocide in Rwanda, need not directly
harm the citizens of other nations.339 However, to the extent that human
rights violations cause consequences beyond borders—such as
contributing to instability, spawning failed states, and increasing the flow
of refugees—the threat of liability provides a global public good from
which the United States benefits as a producer and consumer of global
order. And there are other human rights violations that may pass the Sosa
threshold and can truly be called interstate. Fighting piracy was a classic
public good recognized as a paradigm in Sosa.340 While modern-day
pirates are likely to have few assets, many organizations and persons who
fund terrorism do have significant resources that can be reached through
ATS lawsuits, complementing law enforcement and military efforts.341
Terrorism is analogous to piracy in the way that it disrupts commerce,
imposing costs on all nations, but especially on the United States.342

337. See generally Sloss, supra note 283.
338. See Knowles, supra note 10, at 145–51.
339. See SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
329–90 (2002) (showing how the United States, Western European governments, and the United
Nations all chose not to intervene to prevent the Rwandan genocide in large part for this reason);
McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1240–41.
340. 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2006).
341. See JIMMY GURULE, UNFUNDING TERROR 339–44 (2008); Beth Van Schaak, Finding the
Tort of Terrorism in International Law, 28 REV. LITIG. 381, 385 (2008) (concluding that the tort of
terrorism is ―precise, robust, and uncontroversial‖ enough to meet the Sosa threshold, and that
recognizing the norm as ATS-actionable would ―bolster the United States‘ counter-terrorism regime
by enabling a broader array of victims of acts of terror to pursue the assets of individuals and groups
that finance or otherwise support acts of terrorism‖).
342. See generally THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS (Harry W. Richardson,
Peter Gordon & James E. Moore II eds., 2006).
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The second major benefit also relates to the cheapness of signaling, but
looks to a future international system in which the United States is no
longer the sole superpower.343 ATS jurisprudence influences the definition
of CIL that will be used by global legal institutions like the International
Criminal Court.344 These institutions are mechanisms through which the
U.S. can exert an outsized influence in the international system after its
relative power has declined.345 These global legal institutions may have
some ―stickiness‖ in the sense that they provide a basis upon which
nations can signal self-restraint. If the norms recognized by international
institutions are closely aligned with U.S. law, emerging great powers—
such as China, India, and Brazil—will pay higher costs than the United
States to signal cooperativeness through compliance with CIL.
IV. WEIGHING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ATS LITIGATION
In the absence of comprehensive empirical evidence, efforts to weigh
the costs and benefits of ATS litigation may seem like a quixotic task. But
when mistaken revisionist assumptions are stripped away, the benefits of
ATS litigation can be seen more clearly. It then becomes possible to
construct a realist model under which ATS litigation is welfare-positive
for the United States. Empirical studies can prove or disprove that model.
In general, realism holds that nations do not act irrationally.346 Because
it has persisted for decades, ATS litigation deserves the presumption of
rationality. At the very least, we should begin by assuming that ATS
litigation does not negatively impact U.S. interests. From that neutral
standpoint, the costs and benefits can best be weighed.
The optimal strategy for the United States should be to maximize the
signaling effect of ATS litigation, while minimizing the risks of
retaliation, or ―blowback.‖347 Where the target nation is another great
power, the blowback for the United States is potentially at its zenith
because the target nation will have the ability to retaliate. At the same
time, the impact on the target nation will be small because ATS litigation
is unlikely to result in disinvestment or alter human rights practices.348

343. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
344. Cleveland, supra note 6, at 979.
345. See Ikenberry, China, supra note 212, at 13–14.
346. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text.
347. ―Blowback‖ originates from the intelligence context and generally refers to the unintended
harmful consequences of government policies. See generally CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE
COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2d ed. 2004).
348. See supra notes 239–42 and accompanying text.
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China‘s market is so large that MNCs would be willing to pay some
additional costs to do business there, and China, as a powerful state, faces
less external pressure to comply with human rights norms.349 Conversely,
where the target nation is not powerful, ATS lawsuits have a greater
impact on the target country but less potential to cause blowback for the
United States.350 ATS lawsuits are more likely to generate publicity and
rally substantial support in smaller countries.351 And their governments are
less able to retaliate against the United States.
For the U.S. government as a whole, the optimal strategy is to manage
ATS litigation so that it minimizes blowback while maximizing impact.
Contrary to the warnings of revisionists, the history of ATS litigation thus
far demonstrates that these are precisely the priorities that courts and even
plaintiffs have followed, consciously or not, in ATS litigation. The
lawsuits with the greatest potential for blowback involved events in China,
which resulted in one declaratory judgment and a settlement by an
MNC.352 Yet the China litigation has had no discernible effect on SinoAmerican relations, nor has it caused U.S. companies to disinvest in China
or discouraged Chinese companies from investing in the United States.
The vast majority of ATS lawsuits have involved events and government
officials in less powerful countries.353 Those ending in judgments for the
plaintiffs or settlements have almost all involved nations in Latin America
and Africa.354
Nor is ATS litigation likely to impose significant sovereignty costs.
There is very little risk that a court would enforce a norm not already part
of U.S. domestic law.355 The oft-cited examples of international law
conflicting with U.S. law include norms prohibiting the death penalty and
religious blasphemy.356 But it is very hard to see how these norms could be
regarded as universal, specific, and obligatory—and ATS actionable—
when they are controversial in the United States.357

349. See MICHAEL KOEBELE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE:
ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH US TORTS LAW 10 (2009) (―Given the degree and
pace of globalization and the necessity for global players to be present in all continents, it seems
unlikely that foreign direct investment will decrease as a result of . . . ATS [litigation].‖).
350. See supra notes 266–71 and accompanying text.
351. See AKOH, supra note 6, at 155–202 (discussing the impact of ATS litigation in African
nations).
352. See supra notes 215–37 and accompanying text.
353. See AKOH, supra note 6, at 150–55.
354. See id.
355. See supra notes 193–98 and accompanying text.
356. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1240.
357. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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In general, the sovereignty and foreign policy costs from ATS litigation
are outweighed by its positive signaling effects. These effects can be seen,
not only in the generally positive response it has received among the
populations of target countries, but in the muted response by U.S. allies
and other governments.358 With a handful of notable exceptions, foreign
governments have rarely voiced their opposition to the lawsuits in
public.359 In fact, the most consistent objections to ATS litigation have
come from the executive branch of the U.S. government.360 It is logical to
assume from this that other nations have calculated that the costs of ATS
litigation are outweighed by its benefits. Like the United States, other
nations benefit from signaling cooperativeness through compliance with
human rights norms. ATS litigation actually enables cheaper signaling for
them as well because the target nations do not have to pay the often high
costs of bringing human rights violators to justice. Where offenders are
former government officials, prosecutions or civil liability can be very
difficult for political reasons. And MNC defendants may possess a great
deal of economic leverage over target countries.
Because there is a high bar for success in ATS litigation, there is little
chance that it can become an all-purpose tool for addressing global
problems. Although its costs are quite small in terms of diplomatic friction
and blowback, its strategic benefits through signaling are also likely to
remain small. Despite its popularity with international and U.S. foreign
affairs law scholars, ATS litigation plays a minor role in the vast array of
relationships the United States has with the rest of the world. It is but one
of many signals—positive and negative—the United States sends
regarding its willingness to comply with international law.
This does not mean, however, that ATS litigation is not important.
While its global impact may be modest, its effect on those involved can be
quite profound.361 For some victims of human rights abuses, it offers the
only means of redress or, at the very least, the prospect of serious publicity
about the perpetrators‘ crimes. Were its costs and benefits evenly
balanced, ATS litigation would deserve to continue for this reason alone.

358.
359.
360.
361.

See Cleveland, supra note 6, at 982–83.
See id.
See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 13–14; see also supra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Mysterious and unique, the ATS has generated a rich scholarly
literature and a fierce debate—in- and outside academia—since its 1980
revival.362 Where does it come from, and what was its purpose? Text,
structure, and history have been deeply explored, yielding little, if any,
consensus.363 But lurking in the background are more important questions:
what purpose should ATS litigation serve, and what effect does it have for
the United States in the twenty-first century? This parallel, pragmatic
debate has never been fully engaged because the ATS‘s critics and
defenders cannot agree on the fundamentals of geopolitics.364 Lacking
common ground, the two sides talk past one another, their diverse
assumptions apparently dictating their conclusions about the ATS‘s costs
and benefits.
But there is a way beyond this impasse. Critics and defenders alike
should consider whether their conclusions are justified, even under
alternative paradigms of international relations. For example, if liberalist
insights that democratic nations cooperate more easily are correct, is the
ATS nonetheless a counterproductive means of achieving cooperation
regarding human rights because it interferes with efforts by international
legal institutions to develop human rights law? Such questions should be
explored.
Likewise, the ATS‘s critics ought to consider whether a realist
assessment of costs and benefits actually supports ATS litigation in its
current form. The ATS functions as a much more precise and controllable
foreign policy instrument than its critics give it credit for. ATS litigation
not only furthers the stated U.S. foreign policy goal of promoting human
rights worldwide, but it also advances the United States‘ core security and
economic interests. As the leading power and global provider of public
goods, the United States benefits when it cheaply signals, via the ATS,
support for human rights law. At the same time, the articulation and
development of certain core CIL norms by U.S. courts will give the United
States a crucial advantage, even in a multipolar world.

362. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 1.
364. See supra Part I.

